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ABSTRACT 
 
Most criticism about Cairo’s dysfunctional solid waste management system has been directed 
towards the multinational companies managing it since 2002. This study explores the reason for 
this dysfunction and accordingly devises operational reform recommendations. The study relies 
on qualitative primary data obtained from interviewing representatives of the Egyptian 
government, private sector partners, workers, civil society organizations, investors and 
consultants during 2014 and 2015. The study also relies on the review of secondary data about 
different international models, particularly Brazil, which was taken as a case study for 
comparative analysis. The data collected shows that the current management system is 
ineffective due to the Egyptian government’s insufficient financial and administrative planning 
prior to contracting with multinational companies. Additionally, systemic problems at Cairo’s 
local administration level has led to a continued state of a hindrance to reform efforts. Cairo’s 
officials have already identified some relevant reform interventions to introduce. These include 
substituting the multinational companies with the national companies formed by traditional 
waste workers of Cairo, introducing financial and administrative reforms, encouraging recycling 
through applying waste segregation at source, and supporting composting and waste-to-energy 
technology. Success of these reform plans, however, is dependent on the national solid waste 
management authority’s autonomy, ability to devise and implement a national policy plan that 
takes different stakeholder interests into account and the capacity of waste workers to organize 
under legal entities.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Background 
1.1 Introduction  
 
Solid waste management (SWM) has become a subject of global concern, over the past few 
decades, due to rise in waste production with the increase in the world population. In 2012, 
World Bank estimated the global production of solid waste in cities to be 1.3 billion tons per year 
and expected volumes to reach 2.2 billion tons by the year 2025 (Hoornweg and Tata, 2012). The 
incidents of urbanization have also been increasing lately, especially in developing countries 
(Khatib, 2011), which consequently means an increase in municipal solid waste produced since 
solid waste increases as the standards of living improve (Babanawo, 2006). 
The importance of SWM in Greater Cairo relates to the fact that it is a mega urban center 
including Cairo, the capital city, in addition to Giza and Qalyobia governorates (GOPP, 2016) 
and produces almost 50% of the total national municipal solid waste generated (Sweepnet, 
2010). The optimization of operation has economic, environmental and health implications for 
the region. The demand for recyclable waste items in industry, to replace expensive raw material, 
has created an economic value for the waste, which depends on its successful collection 
(Gunsilius et al, 2011). Sanitary waste disposal methods can also reduce the harmful 
environmental effects of openly dumping waste which leads to harmful gas emissions (EPA, 
2002). Land-filling waste, as well, can lead to long-term damage to the soil if done 
inappropriately (Babanawo, 2006). Finally, an unmanaged waste system can increase the 
probability of workers’ contraction of occupational health diseases due to their daily close 
contact with waste (Shukla, 2000). For these reasons, it is vital to carefully develop an effective 
management system for waste.  
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Evidence in the literature suggests that the process in Cairo has not been operating well for 
years (Fahmi and Sutton, 2010). The objective of this study is to understand the reasons behind 
this insufficient process management through analysis of daily operations and interactions 
between the different stakeholders of the system. The study also examines the role of each 
stakeholder in-depth and investigates the government’s plans for future reform. Qualitative 
Primary data was collected through interviews and a focus group discussion with Cairo’s 
stakeholders. Additionally, a secondary literature review was made of Brazil’s urban model as 
was used for comparative analysis. In accordance with the data collected and analyzed, the 
research offers a set of policy reform recommendations to improve Cairo’s system management.  
The researcher claims that there are several factors, other than competency of the 
international companies, which contributed to the poor state of the current SWM in Cairo. She 
also declares that unless these factors are understood and accounted for, the planned future 
policy will not bare the desired success. 
1.2 Statement of the problem  
 
Despite the importance of Greater Cairo, the condition of MSW management suffers 
considerable setbacks. In 2002, Cairo’s local authorities signed an agreement with several 
international waste management companies to take over management of the city’s solid waste in 
an attempt to upgrade the service (Fahmi and Sutton, 2010). The outcomes of the partnership, 
however, have not been successful and received heavy criticism from the community (El 
Rashidi, 2012). With no improvement of the service over the years, the issue started generating 
much public outcry, to the extent that waste management remained a popular topic of coverage 
in daily newspapers and a priority in government agendas (Salah et al, 2016).   
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The problem with the system is cross -cutting on different operational levels. Garbage 
collection rates were visibly poor causing distaste and frustration at the sight of accumulated 
waste in the streets, even in high-income neighborhoods (Guenard, 2013) Also with time, due to 
poor collection rates, random people started making a living out of scavenging the waste in 
search for recyclables to sell (Eco Con Serv, 2010). In addition, efficiency of waste disposal was 
questionable as agreements with international companies obliged them to no more than a 20% 
recycling rate which was viewed as too low (Fahmi and Sutton, 2010). 
In the wake of the heavy criticism, and with the contracts of multinational companies being 
on the verge of expiring in 2017 (Eco Con Serv, 2009), government officials started announcing 
their plans to hand over management of the system to companies formed by the historical Cairo 
waste collectors ie. Zabaleen (Kingsley, 2014). Before the international private companies were 
contracted, Zabaleen had been in charge of SWM of Cairo since the 1930s and 1940s (Fahmi and 
Sutton, 2006). There is much literature that speaks highly of the outcomes of the system under 
the management of the Zabaleen, such as Fahmi and Sutton (2010), Zaki et al (2013) and Dias 
and Alves (2008). Their high recycling rates that reached up to 80-85%% of collected waste 
were especially highlighted (Dias and Alves, 2008). This raises the question of why the 
government sought the shift to subcontracting with multinational service providers in 2002 and 
how it plans on returning to Zabaleen without creating the same conditions that it preferred to 
leave behind. It is also not clear why the international companies, with their global experience in 
the field, could not achieve better results or what was exactly happening on daily basis between 
stakeholders in the management cycle. How is the government planning, as well, on avoiding the 
inefficiencies that took place during the years of the international management and how have 
financial, administrative and other constraints contributed to the problem?   
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1.3 Research Questions  
 
This research seeks to investigate the conditions which led to the management shift in 
Greater Cairo’s SWM in 2002, in addition to the factors that caused the multinational private 
management in Cairo to fall beyond expected results. It also aims to understand the details of the 
new plans after 2017, when international agreements expire (Debout, 2012), and accordingly 
formulate an in-depth analysis and a set of recommendations for reform in accordance to the 
findings. A case study of Brazil’s urban municipal solid waste management (MSWM) model will 
be reviewed as a reference for comparative analysis to the Greater Cairo model. Brazil’s urban 
municipal solid waste management evolved in away quite similar to the one in Cairo but the 
current outcomes in Brazil have yielded positive results, which makes it an optimal case for 
study. Brazil and Egypt also share similar socio-economic factors that helps minimize external 
factors from the comparison.  
1.4 Research design  
The research relies on qualitative analysis of primary data collected from conducting 15 
individual interviews and one focus group discussion with seven additional stakeholders. The 
sample included representatives of the government, waste management companies, waste 
collectors, non-governmental organizations and community activists, independent consultants, 
and private sector investors. Review of secondary literature was used to formulate an overview 
of MSW management in Cairo, research global SWM conditions in other developing countries 
and perform an in-depth investigation into the Brazil’s urban case study. 
The study is divided into five chapters starting with an introduction and background of the 
topic, followed by a literature review, then a conceptual framework and methodology chapter. 
The final two chapters of the study are dedicated to presenting the findings, their analysis and the 
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recommended reforms. The findings chapter discusses the stakeholders’ take on the current and 
future SWM in Cairo and the analysis chapter analyzing the results and drawing reform 
recommendations and conclusions.  
1.5 Background of MSWM  
 
Municipal solid waste can be defined as everyday unwanted garbage generated in homes, 
businesses, schools and hospitals such as food remains, fabric, paper, cans and bottles, 
equipment, batteries and other similar items (U.S. EPA website, undated). The management of 
solid waste is a term that refers to the different phases waste goes through from the moment of 
generation to its final disposal. According to UNEP, the main stages of MSWM can be 
summarized into:  
 
 Fig.1 MSWM stages (UNEP, 2009, p.19) 
1.6 MSW generation in Greater Cairo  
 
Cairo, Egypt’s capital city, is considered the largest urban mass in Africa (UN Habitat, 2010). 
Cairo constitutes one of the governorates of the Greater Cairo mega-city, an urban region which 
includes Cairo, Giza and Qalyobiya. In 2016, Greater Cairo’s population reached 22.6 million 
inhabitants (CAPMAS, 2016), 25% of the total Egyptian population of 90.9 million (Ibid). In 
2012, the share of Greater Cairo in the daily municipal solid waste production reached 23 million 
Generation Collection Transportation
Treatment Recycling/Recovery Final Disposal
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tons of the total country’s daily 57 million tons produced ie. Approximately 50% (Zaki et al, 
2013) 
 
 
 
MSW composition usually varies according to several factors, the most deciding ones 
being the level of income, lifestyle and size of the population (Zayani, 2010).  Waste 
composition is important because it is one of the factors that must be taken into consideration in 
determining the optimal methods of waste management. The general composition of Greater 
Cairo can be leveled against the expected general composition of similar urban areas as seen in 
the following diagram.  
Fig.2 Map of Egypt showing Greater Cairo (GOPP, 2012, p.19) 
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Fig.3 Composition or Urban Solid Waste (Zayani, 2010, p.11) 
 
1.7 The Institutional and Strategic Framework of MSWM in Egypt 
 
I- Institutional Level  
The institutional nationwide governance of MSWM in Egypt is divided between the 
Ministry of Environmental Affairs, the Ministry of Local Development, the Ministry of Health 
and Population, the Ministry of Housing, the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation, the 
Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Investment (Zaki et al, 
2013) and up until recently, the Ministry of Urban Renewal and Informal Settlements till it was 
dissolved in 2015 (Sabry, 2015). In 2009, the Inter-Ministerial Committee (IMC) was created of 
representatives from the most vital ministries relevant to SWM to act as a steering body of 
authority (Ibid). Recently, in Nov 2015, the MEA established a new authority to be assigned 
responsibility for SWM in Egypt. The “Waste Management Regulatory Agency” was created 
Organic , 60%
Plastic , 12%
Inert , 11%
Paper, 10%
Glass, 3% Metal, 2% Textile, 2%
Organic Plastic Inert Paper Glass Metal Textile
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with Decree 3005 of 2015 (EEAA, 2015). According to the decree, the Agency would be 
responsible for planning and implementation of SWM at the national level (Ibid).  
While ministries work on developing laws and regulations, the Egyptian Environmental 
Affairs Agency (EEAA), an affiliate with the MEA, is responsible for monitoring and evaluating 
their implementation (Zaki et al, 2013).  
 On the local level, governorates, cleansing and beautification agencies and municipalities 
are the implementing bodies. Their responsibly includes contracting with service providers, 
inspection and monitoring, as well as offer training programs. (Sweepnet, 2010).  In addition, 
local and international waste management companies are responsible for all stages of operations 
(collection, transportation, sorting, recovery, recycling and disposal) (Ibid).   
Informal waste collectors and non-governmental organizations take on the same role of 
waste management service providers, along with sanitation private companies, in addition to 
providing other community services related to the sector (Ibid). 
II- Strategic Level  
There have been several efforts undergone by the Egyptian government to develop a 
national strategy to upgrade the SWM operations, over the course of the years. In 2000, the 
Ministry of Environment’s Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA) created a national 
strategy to shift operations away from the Zabaleen-managed system towards gradually 
delegating service provision to the private sector. This came into application two years later 
when the government contracted with multinational private companies in 2002 (Dias and Alves, 
2008). In the 2000 National Strategy, local authorities were given full responsibility for 
management and emphasis was placed on abiding by waste recycling and recovery given the 
economic value of waste (Debout, 2012). Additionally, the strategy reserved a section to tackle 
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pollution and to endorse the “polluter pays principle”, a concept that refers to placing financial 
liability on polluters (Zaki et al, 2013). Unfortunately, though, many of the principles developed 
by the national strategy of 2000 were not implemented (Ibid). 
  In 2010, a study aiming at preparing a new national SWM program (NSWMP) was 
launched with the support of the German government and the EU. The project worked closely 
with the IMC to analyze the framework of SWM operations and accordingly develop a 
recommended national policy (Zaki et al, 2013). Following that step, the MEA established the 
Integrated Solid Waste Management Sector (ISWMS) with a mandate to implement the new 
NSWMP being developed (Ibid). The main sections of the proposed NSWMP pertain to 
enhancing operations of SWM, setting up national and local workplans, endorsing investment 
opportunities with multi-stakeholders, involving civil society actors and recognition of waste 
management as a profession (EEAA, 2015). Whether these plans will formulate into a national 
policy and whether it will find necessary conditions for implementation still remains to be seen, 
at this stage.   
1.8 The Legal Framework of MSWM in Egypt 
 
At the current time, there is no specific policy for SWM in Egypt. Several laws exist, 
each of which regulates a certain aspect of the operations such as laws for enforcing service fees’ 
collections, requirements for building landfills, equipment specifications, methods of disposal 
and allocation of operation areas (Debout, 2012). Following is a brief of some of the most 
prominent national laws issued to govern SWM:  
 
 
 
  15   
 
Law no. and Date of 
Issuance 
Main Terms 
Law # 38 of 1967 and its 
amendment by Law # 31 of 
1976  
Governorates (local authorities) are assigned the responsibility of SWM ie. 
contracting with service providers and service monitoring. It also imposes 
taxes on households for cleaning services accounting for 2% of household 
rent value (Ibid) 
Decree # 134 of 1968 
Regulation of services to new urban areas, including waste management, 
falls under the authority of the then Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban 
Development (Ibid)  
Law n°43 of 1979 
Assigns authority of SWM to the governorate municipalities (local authority) 
(Ibid) 
Decree # 284 of 1983 
Establishment of the Cairo and Giza Cleansing and Beautification Agencies 
(local authorities) to manage SWM in their respective governorates (Ibid) 
Law # 4 of 1994 
This law regulates specifications of waste management vehicles, bins, 
disposal and treatment sites. It also established the EEAA, an authority under 
the MEA, to oversee and approve these specifications. Noteworthy is that 
this law has special emphasizes on hazardous waste (Ibid) 
Law # 10 of 2005  
Following the contracting with multinationals, this law was issued to amend 
Law # 38 of 1967 to transfer cleanliness fees to electricity bills with a range 
of EGP1- EGP10 in urban governorate households (Ibid) 
Decree # 189 of 2014 and 
Decree # 1252 of 2014 
Establishment of the MURIS (SIS,2014) as an authority to manage SWM 
and devise a national strategy for operations (EIP, 2014)  
Decree # 3005 of 2015 
Establishment of the Waste Management Regulatory Agency, an affiliation 
to the MEA, to regulate and manage all stages of SWM on a national level 
(EEAA, 2015) 
 
Table1: Legal Framework of MSWM in Egypt  
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1.9 The Stages of Cairo’s MSWM Operations Development 
 
I- The informal years  
Historically, the first activities for waste management started in Cairo in the 1930s and 
1940s via a group of people called the “wahis”, indicating their origins in the Egyptian desert 
Dakhla Oasis before their migration to Cairo. (Fahmi and Sutton, 2006). Wahis took the role of 
management where they would approach building owners, pay for the right to collect from the 
building tenants and would later charge tenants fees for waste collection services (Fahmi 2005). 
The wahis were then joined by another sect of migrants, this time hailing from the rural 
governorate of Assuit, called “Zabaleen” (Fahmi, 2005); an Arabic word used to refer to 
informal waste collectors and is rooted from the Arabic word “zebala” meaning garbage 
(Aguirre, 2015). Following their settlement in Cairo, they joined forces with wahis where they 
would either collect from tenants free of charge in exchange for keeping the waste or sometimes 
even buy it off wahis (El- Missery El Al, 2009). The Zabaleen understood the value of waste and 
treated it as an asset, lived off recycling and recovering inorganic items in it such as plastic, 
metal and glass and using the organic part as fodder for their pig farming. Pig meats were a 
delicacy and their market included selling to touristic venues (Fahmi and Sutton, 2010). Over the 
years, Zabaleen grew and expanded and now reside in seven different settlements in Greater 
Cairo, the biggest of which being in Manshiet Nasser, Al Mokattam district (Fahmi 2005). One 
of the recent estimates of the Zabaleen population was numerated at 96,000 (Debout, 2012).  
Their collection rates in Cairo between 2004 and 2009 averaged 20.5% (Debout, 2012)  with a 
recycling percent of 80-85% (Dias and Alves, 2008). 
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II- The beginning of formalization  
In an attempt to acquire formalization and official recognition, the Zabaleen and Wahis 
entered an agreement together in 1989 to establish their first registered waste management 
company, the “Environmental Protection Company”. Under the terms of the agreement, the 
Zabaleen would be contracted by the wahis to collect from households and dispose of the waste 
whereas wahis would be in charge of administration, marketing for the company and collecting 
household fees (Fahmi 2005). Over time, more SWM smaller companies were established by 
Zabaleen making them the biggest service provider by the 2000s (Debout, 2012).  
III- Contracting with Multinational Companies  
Following the issuance of the 2000 national strategy, an international call for tender was 
announced for SWM service providers and in 2002, contracts were signed with multinational 
companies (Fahmi and Sutton, 2010). An Italian company (AMA) and two Spanish Companies 
(FCC & Urbaser and Enser) each was assigned the management of a quarter of Cairo’s area. The 
CCBA was also assigned the South quarter later subcontracted the Egyptian Company for 
Garbage Collection (ECGC) and the Italian International Environmental Service (IES) to take 
over services for its sector (Ibid). The agreement was for the duration of 15 years, effective till 
2017 (Eco Con Serv, 2009) under which the international companies would be managing all 
stages of Cairo’s operations with a required recycling rate of 20% in exchange for a fixed annual 
fee (Fahmi and Sutton, 2010). The exact figure of the annual service fees quoted in the 
agreements is disputable. Some sources claim it is as high as USD 50 million (Ibid), others say it 
is no more than EGP1 36 million (the equivalent of USD 4 million) (EcoConServ, 2010) or 
between EGP 55-80 million (USD 6.25-9 million) (Sweepnet, 2010).  
 
1 Calculations based on the exchange rate given by the Central Bank of Egypt, as of April 11th, 2016.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review  
 
There is an abundance of literature surrounding the subject of MSWM, in general. 
Scholars, such as Zaki et al (2013), Gunsilius et al (2011), Bhuiyan, (2010), Casanova (2009) 
and Babanawo (2006),  have approached the topic from several angles which can perhaps be sub-
categorized into two major approaches. The first relates to process optimization and its relevant 
socio-economic, health and environmental benefits.  The second discusses policy and looks at 
country case studies to examine empirical policy approaches for SWM in implementation. As 
this research focuses on Cairo’s model and seeks to develop recommendations for its policy 
development, this literature review centers especially around the writings featuring Cairo, while 
also giving a brief of parallel relevant information. The chapter starts by a brief explanation of 
the current SWM procedure that is endorsed globally as an optimal model and reviews the 
implications related to adhering to this good governance model. This is followed by an in-depth 
examination of how the literature discussed Cairo’s policy plans for SWM focusing on 
performance outcomes, adverse effects and the new government policy plans for the future. 
Finally, a brief about successful policies used in other developing countries is provided to 
complete the picture. Emphasis is placed on Brazil’s urban MSWM case study and its success 
factors. Finally, the literature gaps are pointed out and a brief about how this study addresses 
them is explained. 
2.1 Optimization of SWM  
 
Zaki et al (2003), Babanawo (2006) and Casanova (2009) discuss SWM not only in its 
procedural sense but also from a good governance point of view. The global outlook on SWM 
currently seeks optimization of the process through prioritizing reduction of waste production 
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and eventually the fraction disposed. Although disposal in land, through open dumps or even 
sanitary landfills, is unavoidable and is considered the most frequent means of disposal, it has 
several harmful effects (Babanawo, 2006). This system of prioritizing waste treatment over 
disposal is commonly referred to in the literature as the “hierarchy” of SWM (Zaki et al, 2013) as 
shown in the following diagram: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.4 Waste Hierarchy Pyramid (Zaki et al, 2013, p.30 ) 
 
A SWM process that accounts for best practices pertaining to public health, environment 
conservation and economic resource management through prioritizing waste recovery, is also 
globally known as the current worldwide approach of “integrated solid waste management” since 
it takes more than one level into consideration (Casanova, 2009). 
 
 
Undesirable   
Reduce
Re-use
Recycle
Recover
Dispose
Desirable  
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2.2 The Implications of Optimizing SWM  
 
As preceded, the method through which solid waste is managed can have positive or 
negative implications on several different levels. Good governance of SWM is one of the areas 
receiving much of the scholars’ attention in the literature, owing to its social, health, 
environmental and economic effects.  
UN Habitat refers to SWM as being one of the methods devised by the MDG goals 
towards halving world poverty (Casanova, 2009). This is due to the fact that waste pickers, who 
form around 1% of the global population in developing countries, are predominantly 
marginalized sects who live in poverty, some of whom are migrants, women or sustaining 
disabilities which contributes to making their position even more vulnerable. (Medina, 2008). 
Occupational health hazards are also a concern among this working group due to the frequent 
bruises and infections they are subjected to due to the nature of their job (Shukla, 2000). 
Environmentally, failure to manage the system correctly also has dire repercussions since 
uncollected waste left in open air leads to increasing greenhouse emissions which consequently 
contributes to global warming (EPA, 2002).  Disposal of waste in land in open dumps or in 
landfills also has its negative long-term effects. Although land filling is considered more sanitary 
than open dumping, it was found that land filling causes permanent change to soil. In most cases 
land filling still remains less frequent, though, due to the high cost of building landfills. 
(Babanawo, 2006). 
The ability of SWM to serve as a source of economic gain is perhaps one the aspects 
carrying most incentive to policy makers. Due to the reduced prices of retrieved and recyclable 
material as opposed to its raw counterpart, demand has been increasing for these objects in 
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industry. In developing countries, waste pickers are globally known to be highly active in 
recycling with recovery rates reaching up to 80% (Gunsilius et al, 2011). 
2.3 Review of Cairo’s Current SWM system  
 
As preceded, the management under Zableen, before the multinational companies were 
contracted, was praised for being successful and achieving high recycling rates (Dias and Alves, 
2008). On the other hand, one study reviewed reflected on some negative aspects in the state of 
Cairo’s SWM outcomes in the 1990s, during the time Zabaleen managed the system. The study 
was conducted in 1995 and 1997 among tenants of two locations in Greater Cairo (Dar Al Salam 
and Sayyida Zainab) to assess the pollution conditions in their areas. Problems related to poor 
collection and disposal of garbage ranked between the second and the third highest 
environmental concern among both groups, followed only by air and water pollution (Hopkins 
and Mehanna, 2003). 
The new system adopted in 2002, however, received even harsher criticism from public 
and community actors due to what was perceived as a more costly service with poorer outcomes 
(El Rashidi, 2012). The following section presents the most commonly recurring aspects of 
criticism featured in the literature about this current system.  
I- Decline in Collection  
Under the new arrangement, household waste was to be collected from assembly points 
for pick up by the company trucks, not door-to-door as tenants were used to with Zabaleen. This 
was not favored by most tenants who had grown accustomed to the more convenient older 
system that did not require them to carry their garbage to collection points (Eco Con Serv, 2010)  
In addition, collection seemed to be declining. Not long after the partnership came into 
effect, uncollected waste became a daily sight in the streets of the capital city, even in high 
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income areas. Suzie Grace, a well-known community activist who lives in the upscale 
neighborhood of Heliopolis, reportedly described the streets as Cairo un-walkable and 
“disgusting” (Guenard, 2013). The new system only kept receiving harsher criticism as time 
went by with some local newspapers running news about collection trucks being witnessed 
dumping waste in different parts of the city such as the highway Ring Road, in irrigation canals 
and even in archeological historic sites as opposed to transporting them to the dumping sites 
(Egypt Independent, 2012).  
In a study published in 2009, tenants from Giza among tenants from 3 other governorates 
across the country (Gharbia, Luxor and Ismailia) were asked to evaluate the SWM system. Giza 
came in at first place with 93% of respondents saying that the system needed improvement (Eco 
Con Serv , 2009).  No accurate data about Greater Cairo could be found, but average percentage 
of waste collected from urban Egyptian cities was recorded at 40-90% in 2010 (Sweepnet, 2010) 
years after the multinational agreements came to effect.  
II- The Rise of Scavenging 
The years of accumulation of uncollected waste in the streets, also gave rise to a further 
complication.  A group of people who made a living out of rummaging the trash in search for 
recyclables to sell to dealers began emerging. Increasing unemployment rates and poverty, the 
expanding market need for recyclables and the deficiency of the SWM system are the main 
reasons attributed to the rise  of this activity. (Eco Con Serv, 2010). No accurate count was found 
to the number of scavengers in Greater Cairo but their number nationally is estimated at 55,000 
persons. (Ibid) Their origin is thought to be poverty-stricken Cairo tenants in dire need of a 
source of income but evidently some are also Zabaleen (El-Rashidi, 2012).  
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Worth mentioning is that after 2009, Zabaleen were evidently partaking in scavenging by 
picking out the inorganic valuables only and leaving the rest of the trash to rot in the streets 
(Fahmi and Sutton, 2010) . The reason is that in May 2009, the Egyptian government took an 
abrupt decision to slaughter all the pigs they owned, as a protective measure against the breakout 
of swine flu (Debout, 2012).  With the pigs gone, the Zabaleen no longer found incentive to 
collect the organic parts of the waste (Fahmi and Sutton, 2010), which comprises its major 
component (Zayani, 2010). Consequently, their collection rates considerably declined which 
added to the pre-existing problem of poor collection service. 
III- Inefficiency of Recycling and Human Resource Management  
Collection-related aspects, though, were not the only problems that received judgment. 
Low required recycling rates of 20% compared to the older achieved 80% by the Zabaleen also 
raised doubts about the system’s effectiveness (Fahmi and Sutton, 2010). It is important to note, 
at this point, that without an accurate estimate of collection rates before and after the 
multinationals were assigned operations, it is not possible to assess whether or not recycling rates 
indeed declined. 
Moreover, with the new formalized system a lot of the informal Zabaleen were excluded, 
either losing their jobs or access to the waste which comprised their biggest income generating 
source. This was perceived as unfair and inefficient since it failed to make use of their vast 
experience and adds to the country’s unemployment rates which ranged 10-13% of total labor 
force in the last decade (World Bank website, undated).  Eventually, the multinational 
corporations were eventually forced to reconcile with Zabaleen and sub-contract most of them 
due to their inability to recruit new workers (Fahmi and Sutton 2006). 
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IV- The Financial Inadequacy of the system  
During the planning phase, estimation of the expected revenue from collecting service 
fees from tenants was made assuming bills would be fully-paid, which did not turn out to be the 
case. In practice, many Cairo households refused to pay the sanitary fees, and the government 
ended up with a 35% deficit in the budget as a result (Eco Con Serv, 2009). To overcome having 
to subsidize the difference, officials began fining the private companies for failure to meet 
contractual requirements; many of which were evidently not explicitly defined to the companies 
prior to the agreement (Coad, 2005).  
Perhaps due to the heat of criticism from angry citizens, officials remained keen on 
regularly blaming the multinationals for the poor delivery of the service and announcing to local 
media that they were heavily fining them. Many such examples exist, a few of which include 
news of authorities deducting 70% off the Italian company (Fekry et al, 2009) and the governor 
of Giza fining one of the private companies for unsatisfactory collection (El Banna, 2014). This 
was also reciprocated by representatives of the multinational companies who insisted on 
denouncing the claims and blaming government officials for inaccuracies in defining their 
expectations within the contracts in addition to withholding required data about the city. (Eco 
Con Serv, 2009).  
In an attempt to improve outcomes, the government decided in 2010 to amend the 
partnership agreement payment terms and made pricing linked to weight of waste managed, 
instead of a fixed annual fee. EGP 250 per ton was the new pricing introduced (Sweepnet, 2010), 
however no significant change in outcomes, after the amendment, was recorded in the literature.  
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2.4 Plans For a Shift in Cairo’s SWM after 2017  
 
In the recent years, following the 2011 Egyptian revolution, officials started becoming 
more ready to admit the shortcomings of the private operations  introduced by the former regime 
and embrace the need for change. In his 2012 presidential election campaign, president Morsi (El 
Rashidi, 2012) included a plan for SWM. The campaign vowed to launch the “Clean Homeland” 
project to clean the streets of Cairo in 100 days (Viney, 2012). After his election, the plan did not 
yield much outcome (Ibid), however, it signified a shift in the government’s previous belief in 
partnering with the multinational private sector. In 2014 when MURIS was established,  the 
minister selected to head it was Dr. Laila Iskander, a prominent community activist well known 
for her support of the Zabaleen  and former Minister of Environment (SIS,2014). The choice of 
such a minister also re-affirmed the transition in outlook.  
Since its inception, MURIS announced on more than one occasion their plans to return to 
recruiting Zabaleen and even started issuing uniforms and vehicles to them (Kingsley, 2014). 
After MURIS was dissolved and the new Waste Management Regulatory Agency took over in 
Nov 2015, the agency also announced similar plans. In an interview with state-owned Al Ahram 
daily newspaper, Yahia Abdullah, the agency manager said he planned to follow in the footsteps 
of the ex-MURIS by continuing to bring back Zabaleen but only though contracting Zabaleen-
run private companies (Salah et al, 2016). Details about the workplan or methodology of doing 
so were not shared but evidently the agency was undergoing research to identify a specific 
framework for SWM after the multinational contracts expire (Ibid).  
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2.5 Global Models of SWM in Developing Countries: Case Study of Brazil 
 
When looking at some models of MSWM in developing countries similar to Egypt, the 
partnership model between government and national service providers emerges as a popular 
solution deployed in several of them. In Bangladesh, urban cities suffer insufficient SWM 
services due to poor governance and lack of resources (Bhuiyan, 2010). One pilot project that 
received good success rates in urban districts of Bangladesh was a partnership model between 
the government and private sector /NGOs (Ibid). Similarly, in India, the National Alliance of 
Waste Pickers (an organization that represents informal workers) was authorized by the 
government to collect municipal waste in Pune (Dias and Alves, 2008). Perhaps one of the case 
studies closest to Egypt is the Brazilian urban model, which depends on historical waste pickers 
cooperatives and organizations contracted by the government for MSWM services in cities 
(Sheridan et al, 2012).   
Case Study of Brazil’s MSWM 
Brazil was selected as a case study for its resemblance to Egypt on more than one level. 
Firstly, in terms of gross domestic product (GDP), Egypt and Brazil are both classified as 
developing middle-income countries (UN, 2012). Secondly, the origin of MSWM in the urban 
cities of Brazil bares a great deal of resemblance to the Greater Cairo model with the exception 
that Brazil’s progress has now greatly surpassed the one in Cairo. This conditions Brazil to be an 
excellent model for a comparative study to draw lessons from for application in Egypt. 
The development of SWM in Brazil 
Historically, SWM started in Brazil at the hands of a group of people who lived off picking 
through garbage piles to find organic waste to feed the pigs they raised for meat (Dias and Alves, 
2008). Over decades, this waste recovery activity developed to include inorganic recyclables like 
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metal and plastics and these people became known as “waste pickers” (Ibid). Due to their 
continuous proximity to the garbage, waste pickers received much distaste from the public and 
were sometimes even viewed as “part of the rubbish” that dirtied the city (Ibid). 
With time, these informal workers grew in number and in scope of work namely due to 
poverty and because it was not difficult to enter that field of work (Fergutz et al, 2015).  In 2015 
the number of waste pickers in Brazil was estimated to be 500 thousand workers (Ibid) . Brazil is 
a populous country, reaching almost 207.8 Million citizens in 2015 (Worldometer)  which means 
that waste pickers comprise no more than 0.2% of the population.  
The recycling rates in Brazil range between 45% to 55% of nationally generated waste, 
but only 1% of that waste is collected by the government, which means that almost all the waste 
is handled by waste pickers (Martina et al, 2012). This shows that the waste pickers are to a great 
extent solely responsible for the recycling business. Today, the waste pickers of Brazil are 
members of many networks and cooperatives for recycling, have been formally recognized by 
their government (Ibid), and have been contracted by the government to manage solid waste 
(Sheridan et al, 2012).   
The road to recognition and formalization of the waste pickers’ activities took time and 
multiple efforts. Up till the end of the 1990s, only 5% of waste pickers had legal work permits, 
most of their activities were considered illegal, their vehicles which utilized human traction were 
banned (pulling a loaded vehicle) and they endured cruel attacks by social cleansing groups that 
would sometimes murder them to sell their bodies for medical research (Fergutz et al, 2012).  
In the 1970s, the Catholic Church and its affiliate non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) began offering charitable help to care for waste pickers in urban cities. This gradually 
led to the foundation of the first waste pickers’ organizations in the mid to late 1980s in Porto 
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Alegre and São Paulo (Dias and Alves, 2008) Following its establishment, the organization in 
São Paulo managed to secure a role in the first management partnership between the local 
municipality and the waste pickers, and consequently managed to develop itself further due to 
the financial gains resulting from this first partnership (Ibid)  Following that stage, more 
organizations for waste pickers were created and partnerships ensued, which paved the way for 
the formation of the first nation-wide waste pickers’ organization (Ibid).  
In 2001, during the first National Congress of Recyclable Waste Pickers, which was 
attended by over 1700 workers, the establishment of the “Movimento Nacional de Catadores de 
Materiais Recicláveis” (MNCR) ie. The National Movement of Recyclable Waste Pickers was 
announced (Fergutz et al, 2012).  This move was the initial step for workers to gain voice, 
national representation and acquire the power to influence policy. Some of the topics they 
needed to address pertained to fair pricing of trading recyclables, labor rights and benefits, 
having their profession recognized, all of which meant respect (Ibid). It was only one year after, 
in 2002, that waste picking became officially recognized by the government and added to the 
Brazilian Classification of Occupations (CBO) (Dias, 2011) 
In 2012, the estimate number of waste picker cooperatives and affiliates represented by 
MNCR reached 300 out of a total 500 that were created during the previous decade (Fergutz et 
al, 2012). Although by 2012, these cooperatives and organizations included members of no more 
than 10% of the waste pickers in Brazil (Ibid), the MNCR managed to bring attention to the 
workers from its early years and obtain benefits on behalf of the profession as a whole. 
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Factors of Success in the Brazilian SWM Partnership with Workers 
1. The Collective Efforts of the workers 
Several factors have been attributed to the success of waste pickers in formalizing their trade 
and swaying local authorities’ opinion towards them. The first theory considers the three key 
determinants to a successful informal sector integration model to be the “3Ps”, namely, the 
ability to form public private partnerships, microenterprises and cooperatives (Medina, 2008). 
Another theory that also focuses on the power of the labor networks created prefers to name 
“4Vs” as the drivers of a successful organization (Dias and Alves, 2008).The 4Vs indicate the 
organization’s ability to have voice to represent its members, visibility ie. Societal recognition of 
the role they play, validity through legal identity and viability through achieving economic 
sustainability and growth (Ibid).  
2. The Support of Civil Society Stakeholders  
a. Non-governmental Organizations  
As previously highlighted, the starting point for the organization of informal workers first 
began at the hands of the Catholic Church and NGOs. The role of NGOs in supporting the 
workers’ organizations has been always prevalent (Martina et al, 2012). Although this 
continuous external support may have its advantages, there are some essential drawbacks from 
this model of induced networking that do not depend on spontaneous assembly of its members 
but rather on the influence of an outside party. The first challenge prevalent in the waste picker 
networks is decreased autonomy due to poor management skills. Nonetheless, this does not 
imply an absolute inability to acquire such skills but it does reflect that such organizations 
require time to progress naturally into the capacity to rule and develop themselves (Ibid). 
Another challenge relates to financial standing due to lack of capital to secure efficient service 
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provision. The suggested solution for this is that waste picker organizations receive financial 
support from the local government to facilitate operations in exchange for their waste 
management services (Ibid). 
b. Citizens 
There is a concern within the Brazilian public about some methods devised by the official 
administration to dispose of waste such as excessive land filling and incineration (Global 
Alliance for Waste Pickers, 2011). With waste pickers being advocates of recycling, the interests 
of citizens and waste pickers found alignment. Since success rate of recycling is greatly 
dependent on proper segregation of waste, waste pickers were able to mobilize citizens to 
participate in segregation at source to achieve a collective good (Martina et al, 2012).  
Worth mentioning is that the waste pickers, through the MNCR, have been continuously 
vocal in trying to end Brazil’s dependence on incineration and land filling and had in 2013 drawn 
a petition and collected signatures to push for having a bill released to that effect (MNCR, 2013). 
They have also actively opposed two other legislations permitting incineration (WIEGO).  
3. A Well-defined Policy Framework  
a. The National SWM Policy  
In 2010, Law 12.305/2010 was issued with a National Solid Waste Policy aiming to regulate 
environmentally friendly disposal of waste and decreasing the country’s dependence on land 
filling (Sheridan et al, 2012). The new policy plan not only endorsed reuse and recycling but also 
enforced it in some industries and aimed to eradicate unregulated landfills. Additionally, it 
devised financial models for supporting waste management organization including offering fund 
options to them (Ibid). 
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b. Constitutional Regulations of Waste Management  
The Brazilian constitution has assigned the responsibility of waste management to local 
authorities with each municipal government having to devise its own system (Sheridan et al, 
2012). Noteworthy is that in urban cities, the majority of service provision is offered by the local 
authorities with a 65% rate while private sector manages 35% of the system. For waste picker 
organizations to be assigned management for part of the operations, their companies must 
acquire licensing through a local environmental agency in their respective cities (Ibid). 
2.6 Literature Gaps  
 
There is much detail in the literature about the current shortcomings of SWM under the 
operation of the multinational companies, however, it is not clear why the outcomes are so poor. 
Similarly, the old SWM system run by Zabaleen was perceived to be successful and yet the 
government decided to opt for the multinational alternative. The reason for this is also not clearly 
defined in the literature. There is evidence that the government now favors returning to work 
with Zabaleen after agreements with international companies expire, but that it prefers to do so 
through contracting with Zablaeen-run companies (Salah et al, 2016). The details of how the new 
management model will run, however, is not specified especially regarding measures the 
government will take to keep from repeating the current problems or tackle emerging ones. 
Another area t hat also remains vague is the map of stakeholders who stand to be affected 
directly or indirectly from the MSWM system and how they can be utilized. Scavengers are a 
sect that rose in the last few years to the scene (El-Rashidi, 2012) , but are there other 
stakeholders that have not been properly identified and that can affect the success of the 
reformed system?  
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This study attempts to address these literature gaps by mapping the stakeholders of the 
SWM system, understanding the dynamic relationship they have including the obstacles they 
meet on daily basis. Additionally, the study indentifies specific information about the future 
government plans post-2017. Based on the data collected, a set of reform recommendations will 
be formulated focusing on the existing governmental plans and using recommendations of the 
stakeholders as well as lessons learned from the Brazilian model as a reference.  
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Chapter 3: Conceptual Framework and Methodology 
 
3.1 Conceptual Framework  
 
Based on the literature reviewed, a set of factors can be identified as the main influential 
parameters determining the success of SWM operations. These factors can be further sub-
grouped into internal and external environmental factors as follows:  
 
Internal Environment  
Internal factors affecting the outcomes of waste management companies and organizations relate 
to the following: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Optimization of 
Waste Provision 
Operations 
Organizational Capacity 
(Internally and 
Externally) 
Alignment with 
Contractor 
Requirements 
(Government) 
Financial Adequacy  
- To acquire & 
upgrade equipment 
- To pay labor force  
Alignment with 
Customer 
Requirements 
(Citizens) 
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1. Financial Adequacy: Ability to acquire and maintain equipment and pay for labor force is 
pre-requisite for optimal service provision. For this reason, financial adequacy of the 
service pricing is a key determinant of success. One of the identified reasons for 
inadequate service in Cairo was the gap in service pricing (Eco Con Serv, 2009). 
2. Alignment with Customer Requirements: Citizens’ satisfaction is a deciding factor since 
it directly affects service provider selection and the type of service to be introduced. The 
Egyptian government is currently considering recruiting with Zabaleen after the 
multinational system received negative feedback (Kingsley, 2014). Similarly in Brazil, 
waste pickers managed to mobilize the public into segregating waste at source because 
environmental sustainability is an issue of importance to the citizens (Martina et al, 
2012). 
3. Alignment with Contractor Requirements:  It is important to make sure there is full 
understanding between contractor and contracted parties about the expectations. Evidence 
of miscommunication in defining the terms of agreement between the Egyptian 
government and the multinational contracts has been identified as one of the reasons why 
the system was dysfunctional (Coad, 2005). 
4. Organizational Capacity: In the Brazilin model, waste pickers gradually grew in status 
and received contracts by the government due to their ability to form organizations with 
legal standing. This framework of internal unity gives credibility to the entity and makes 
it appeal to the contractor (Medina, 2008). Furthermore, the capacity of worker entities to 
unite with other fellow organizations and form a united front can give power and voice 
leading to advocacy and collaborative good for the profession, as with the case of 
Brazil’s MNCR (Dias, 2011). 
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External Environment  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Political Conditions: The presence of a coherent and unified source of policy helps define 
the benchmarks and boundaries of the system. Although Egypt’s SWM is governed by 
many laws, no national policy is yet in place to bind them together (Debout 2012) which 
may be one of the problems to the system at hand. Issuance of policy, however, is not the 
only constraint. Making sure the policy is applicable holds as much importance. Although 
the Egyptian government issued a national strategy in 2000, most of its recommendations 
met obstacles in the application phase rendering it a lost effort (Zaki et al, 2013).  
2. Economic Conditions: The government’s ability to secure enough funds to pay for 
maintaining and continuously enhancing the system is an important determinant to its 
success. In the current Cairo model, the SWM system’s main source of revenue is the 
Optimization of 
Waste Provision 
Operations 
Civil Society Conditions 
(Support of NGOs 
and community) 
Environmental 
Conditions (Recovery 
and Recycling 
effectiveness) 
Political Conditions 
(Coherent and 
Applied Policy) 
Economic Conditions 
- Government Budget 
available  
- Ability to attract 
investment 
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service fees paid by the citizens (Debout, 2012). In the new NSWMP being developed, an 
important step was taken to achieving economic sustainability by aiming to open 
investment options with multi-stakeholders as a target source of revenue (Zaki et al, 
2013). 
3. Civil Society Conditions : Civil society organizations and community actors can have a 
crucial role with vulnerable work groups such as waste workers especially pertaining to 
assisting them in organizing and acquiring legal status. Although currently suffering 
much obstacles in Egypt due to government restriction on funding and activities (UCNL, 
2016), the role of civil society in endorsing waste worker to organize falls within the 
current plans of the government. This can provide the needed support from the 
government to NGO activities with these groups.   
4. Environmental Conditions: Since waste is now valued as a source of economic revenue, 
and the government is endorsing recycling strongly in the newly developed NSWMP 
(Zaki et al, 2013), however it is imperative to make sure the required environmental 
conditions for recycling and decreasing disposal are available. An example of such 
conditions is segregation at source and facilitating requirements for composting. 
 
While there are distinctive internal and external variables affecting SWM operations, it is 
noteworthy that all these variables are inter-dependable. The study aims to examine the effect of 
each factor on the current system and what needs to be done for its reform; nevertheless, reform 
recommendations will be devised to address them all in an integral manner.  
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3.2 Methodology 
 
This research uses qualitative data collected from primary sources in addition to review 
of secondary material about Brazil’s urban cities. 
Qualitative method was used due to the complexity of Cairo’s MSWM and the need to 
collect different data from individual cases to perform a comparative in-depth analysis of these 
cases. Additionally, the research required dynamic change in the research questions based on the 
background of each subject and receiving follow up commentary on an issue raised in one 
interview by another interviewee.  
I- Primary and Secondary Resources  
1. Primary Resources  
Qualitative data was collected through conducting individual semi-structured face to face 
interviews with 15 representatives of stakeholders active in Cairo’s SWM cycle of operations. 
Interviewees included representatives of the government, international waste management 
companies, national waste management companies, Zabaleen, NGOs, independent community 
activists, independent consultants, and private sector investors.  One focus group discussion was 
also conducted with seven members of the Zabaleen community. Additionally, a field visit was 
made to a composting plant in Kattamiya and another to the premises of APE in Haram City to 
collect data about their local segregation at source project.  
The interviews sought to clarify the literature gaps regarding the reasons for the 
government’s transition to a privatized MSWM scheme in 2002, identifying all stakeholders of 
the system and their interaction dynamics, how the stakeholders view the current system and 
what interventions they recommend for reform.  
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Selection of the sample relied mostly on purposive methods since stakeholders of SWM 
operations in Cairo are specified groups ie. Specific governmental entities, private companies, 
NGOs and industry. To overcome bias and ill-judgment, selection took into consideration the 
maintaining of a balance between stakeholders in terms of the diversity in gender, working 
grades and different operational sub-sectors of the cycle chain. Following is a detailed 
description of the research sample noting that a detail of the list of interviewees is provided in 
the study annex. 
❖ Governmental Entities  
Four persons representing the MEA and the ex-MURIS were interviewed. The working grades of 
interviewees ranged from top official status to middle management officers. Following are the 
interviewee details: 
- A top-ranking official serving with the MEA and MURIS.  
- Middle-management member, female, EEAA.  
- Investments Officer, female, MURIS.   
- Monitoring and Inspection Officer, male, MURIS.  
❖ International Waste Management Private Company  
The Italian AMA Arab Company was selected for interviewing since it was contracted by the 
Egyptian government in 2002 within its new policy shift to privatization. Ama Arab is a high 
scale company responsible for SWM in the Northern Cairo Section (Fahmi and Sutton, 
2010). The person interviewed is a top management representative assigned to technical 
operations.  
❖ National Waste Management Private Company 
C.E.O of The Enhancement of Integrated Services and Waste Recycling Company 
(ERTEKAA) was interviewed. ERTEKAA is a national medium-scale company founded by 
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Dr. Yousriya Loza-Sawiris, community activist and founder of the Association for the 
Protection of the Environment (ERTEKAA website). The company is headed and managed 
by a group of community activists and operated with a mission towards recycling and zero 
waste. It has received contracts and subcontracts for SWM in East and West Cairo sections in 
addition to managing El Gouna, Red Sea (ERTEKAA website).  
❖ Waste Collectors (Zabaleen) 
Due to their role in hands-on daily management of municipal solid waste, waste collectors 
were considered one of most important sources of data for research. For this reason, 
interviews and a focus group discussion were made with nine members of this group. 
Selection took into consideration diversity in age group and working levels. Their details are 
as follows: 
- Middleman (Licensed Supervising Waste Collector), male.  
- Informal collector and part-time recyclables trader, male.  
- A focus group discussion was conducted with Seven informal waste collectors, male. 
❖ Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
Employees of two NGOs were interviewed for this research. 
a. Association for the Protection of the Environment (APE) 
APE was founded in 1984 by Dr. Yousriya Loza-Sawiris with a mission to promote 
environmentally-friendly solutions to SWM in Egypt and to support waste collectors’ 
community through provision of services such as access to healthcare and education (APE 
website). Interviewees included:  
- Middle management, female, APE Haram City.  
- Consultant, male, APE Kattamiya Compost Plant. 
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- Machine Operations worker, male, APE Kattamiya Compost Plant 
b. Spirit of Youth  
This NGO was founded in 2004, by Dr. Laila Iskander. The mission of Spirit of Youth is 
rights-based and it operates by offering empowering opportunities to the workers of the waste 
collection community and their family members (SOY Facebook page). One employee from the 
NGO’s management team was interviewed.  
❖ One male Independent Community Activist was also interviewed. The activist was chosen 
based on a waste segregation at source project he worked on with a team of other young men. 
The project received support from the Giza governorate.  
❖ Independent Consultants  
Two independent consultants with first-hand experience in the SWM sector in Cairo were 
interviewed. Following are their details:  
- A Professor with The Hubert Humphrey School of Public Policy, University of 
Minnesota and former consultant for Environmental Quality International Egypt (EQI) .  
- An Independent Environmental Consultant, assigned projects with APE and CID 
Consulting. 
❖ Private Sector Investors  
The Executive Vice Chairman of Reliance Investments Egypt was interviewed. Reliance 
Investments Egypt works with the construction, logistics and mining sectors. Their 
customers include, among others, the cement industry which was identified as a 
stakeholder due to their interest in waste-to-energy technology.  
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2. Secondary Resources  
❖ Overview of MSWM in Greater Cairo 
Literature reviewed included statistical data, information about the historical development of 
MSWM in Cairo, its institutional, legal, policy and financial frameworks. A review of the current 
operational outcomes and governmental plans for the future reform was also included 
❖ Case Study: Brazil  
Literature review and analysis is provided about Brazil’s urban cities’ MSWM scheme 
including country statistics, history and evolution of MSWM, the current partnership model 
between local governments and waste picker organizations and its success, policy, institutional 
and legal frameworks governing the system.  
II- Research Limitations 
1. Selection of Sample: Since waste collectors are a large and unspecific population, 
unlike remaining stakeholders, the optimal method of sampling for this group would 
have been random. However, due to the sensitivity of the waste collectors’ community 
and the anticipated element of mistrust towards the researcher, selection of the 
candidates could not be done at random. To ensure trust and increase the possibilities of 
accurate data communicated in the interviews, selecting interviewees was done with the 
help of APE and ERKEKAA who served as a trustworthy intermediate. Consequently, 
this sets limits on whether the sample could be considered representative of the 
Zabaleen community.   
2. Access to Government Records: The researcher’s request to acquire copies of soft or 
hard government records to verify data was rejected. All information communicated via 
government parties was done via oral communication with researcher only. 
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Chapter 4: Cairo’s Current and Future SWM; the Stakeholders’ Stand 
 
This chapter presents the main findings of the study using the primary data collected through 
interviewing Cairo SWM multiple stakeholders.  The aim is to present the conditions under 
which the government sought to partner with multinationals, instead of the Zabaleen since these 
conditions need to be taken into consideration in formulating the recommendations for post-
2017. Additionally, this section presents an account of all stakeholder groups currently active in 
the MSWM cycle including details of their interactions. An evaluation of the current status of 
Cairo’s MSWM is given from each stakeholder’s point of view to help assess shortcomings and 
assign appropriate recommendations for reform. Finally, an investigation into the government’s 
post-2017 plans is included which will serve as the base for analysis and recommendations of 
reform to ensue in the following chapter.  
4.1 What Drove the Shift from Zabaleen to Multinationals?  
 
Based on the findings of this section, the three major reasons that presented incentive for 
the government were its desire to overcome environmental challenges of the older system, the 
need to expand its administrative limitations and the strive to build a modernized image of Cairo. 
Following is a detailed analysis of the results.  
1. Environmental challenges  
One of the concerns of policy makers towards MSWM in Cairo was the unsafe practices 
performed by informal Zabaleen. An example of this was the beginning of the scavenging trend 
practices by some of them in the late 1990s ie. Sorting garbage bags in the streets, after 
collecting them from households, taking the valuables and leaving the rest of the waste discarded 
in the streets. With Zabaleen not getting paid for performing the collection service, but driving 
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their profit from waste recycling operations, several Zabaleen started feeling there was no return 
on investment in paying for transporting the full bag of garbage. This was especially true for the 
Zabaleen who were not active in recycling. (Personal Communication, independent consultant, 
2015). Another reason that is said to have driven the Zabaleen to dump waste in the streets is the 
poor maintenance, capacity and accessibility of transfer stations and dump sites that were 
operated by the government.(Personal Communication, ERTEKAA top management 
representative, 2014) 
Recycling methods used in Zabaleen workshops were also questionable, especially given the 
fact that these workshops were located in the residential areas Zabaleen inhabited ie. In the heart 
of the city (Personal Communication, MURIS middle management representative, 2015) 
These results are consistent with one source reviewed in the literature that detected high rates 
of concern among some Greater Cairo tenants of the state of garbage collection in 1995 and 
1997, ie. Before the multinational agreements (Hopkins and Mehanna, 2003). 
2. Administrative Limitations 
Although the overall operations of collection, transportation, sorting, recycling and disposal 
undergone by the informal workers were considered successful, they did not provide street 
cleaning and sweeping services which was vital to local authorities in Cairo. Instead, these 
services were offered by local authorities ie. Governorates, municipalities or cleansing and 
beautification agencies. The prospect of contracting with one entity for sole responsibility of all 
stages of MSWM was the appeal of the multinational private model. It also implied more 
accountability and ease in monitoring (Personal Communication, independent consultant, 2015) 
Additionally, informal workers were offering less collection services in low-income areas, 
which resulted in garbage ending up uncollected in the streets. As previously mentioned, due to 
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the fact that Zabaleen were not paid to perform collection service but used the waste itself as the 
source of income, waste generated from these kind of areas held little appeal to them since it was 
mostly composed of organic material with little or no recyclables (Personal Communication, 
independent consultant, 2015). 
The reason local authorities did not consider approaching informal workers to request an 
extension of their services in exchange for a financial compensation was that most of these 
workers were not part of an officially registered entity (Personal Communication, independent 
consultant, 2015). More than one interviewed source, however, explained that official licenses 
were being granted to wahis and Zabaleen by municipalities during the 1990s to manage full 
districts which consequently means that there were legally recognized entities among them.  
This, however, was not considered enough proof for the government that Zabaleen had the 
capacity to handle the whole of Greater Cairo (Personal Communication, independent consultant, 
2015). 
In 2000, prior to Cairo’s partnership with multinational companies, a similar model was 
adopted in the Mediterranean Coastal city of Alexandria with a French waste management 
company Onyx (Integral Consult, 2005). In its early stages, the Alexandrian model had showed 
successful outcomes and this leveraged the decision to duplicate the experience in Cairo 
(Personal Communication, ERKEKAA top management representative, 2014). The difference 
between Alexandria and Greater Cairo was not given much weight, at the time, but in practice it 
became apparent that Alexandria which had no informal workers’ community was different than 
Cairo (Personal Communication, ERKEKAA top management representative, 2014). 
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3. The Strive for a modernized Image  
Some informal workers used vehicles and trucks in their operations, but using donkey carts 
was also quite common for waste transportation during the 1990s, at the time the government 
was planning the system upgrade (Personal Communication, independent consultant, 2015). 
With aspirations to improve the image of the Egyptian capital as a modern European-like city, 
the government sought to get rid of the donkey carts by contracting with modern multinational 
companies in an attempt to achieve this goal. This, however, was criticized by another public 
sector official interviewed who saw the move as an un-wise investment in an expensive service 
that aimed at nothing but refining the image of the capital. A more worthy investment, in her 
opinion, was tackling the city’s deep-set poverty related problems. The presence of a pre-existing 
functional system run by the Zabaleen was considered not only enough, in her opinion, but also 
perhaps even more superior than European systems (Personal Communication, top ranked 
government official, 2015). 
 
They want us to be like Europe and modern. If we do not look like Europe then to them it 
means we are backwards. But applying this European model will not work for us. When you 
finish tacking the poverty problems, you can begin looking up to being like Europe. Also, by 
the way, our system was better than the one in Europe. But decision makers did not 
understand this. (Top ranked government official, 2015). 
 
One source even attributed the reason behind entering the multinational agreements to 
Egypt’s hope of hosting the Federation of International Football Association (FIFA) World Cup 
Tournament in 2010 for which Egypt would be thoroughly evaluated and inspected (Personal 
Communication, government middle management representative, 2015). According to FIFA, a 
visit was made to Egypt, in Jan 2004, to evaluate the country’s football facilities available but 
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also its general infrastructure capacity to host the event. Among fields of inspection were roads, 
transportation and medical services (FIFA). 
4.2 Stakeholders’ Analysis  
 
Over the years, the dynamics of Cairo’s SWM witnessed different changes, some of which 
relate primarily to the difference in stakeholders entering and exiting from the field as well as the 
nature in the dynamics between them. This section presents the stakeholder roles, the dynamics 
of their interactions in addition to their recommendations for reform. Government entities 
interviewed also present their plans for post-2017 which will be assessed and analyzed 
thoroughly in the following chapter.  
 
I- The Hierarchy of the MSWM provision in Greater Cairo  
According to the findings, there are several stakeholders directly involved in the system. The 
diagram below highlights the daily relationship between these stakeholders: 
 
Fig.5: The Hierarchy of the MSWM provision in Greater Cairo (based on primary data) 
Ministries
Local Authorities  
(Governorates/Municipalities 
/CCBA/GCBA)
Contracted 
International 
Companies 
(North/East/West 
Cairo)
Subcontracted National 
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Middleman
zabaleen
Contracted 
National 
Companies (South 
Cairo)
Middleman
zabaleen
Licensed 
Middleman
(South Cairo)
Zabaleen
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II- Mapping of the stakeholders in Greater Cairo 
In addition to the parties involved in daily provision of MSWM in Cairo, the stakeholder 
network is greater and more diverse. Following is the classification of stakeholders identified 
based on the data collected and secondary resources.  
Stakeholder Affiliates Actual Role 
Governmental Entities – 
National Level  
Several Ministries and affiliate 
Agencies eg. MEA, former 
Minister of MURIS- (Zaki et al, 
2013) 
Policy Planning -(Zaki et al, 2013) 
Governmental Entities – Local 
Level 
 CCBA and GCBA in Cairo and 
Giza - (Sweepnet, 2010) + 
municipalities/governorates in 
other locations 
Licensing 
Contracting 
Monitoring and Inspection of 
implementing body- (Sweepnet, 2010) 
International High scale Waste 
Management Companies  
AMA Arab, Urbaser, FCC, IES, 
Europe 2000- (Fahmi and Sutton, 
2010) 
Managing all stages of SWM in North, 
East and West  of Greater Cairo - 
(Fahmi and Sutton, 2010) 
National high, medium and small 
scale Waste Management 
Companies 
Youth-led low budget start-ups, 
established entities eg. ERTEKAA 
Subcontracted  by International 
Companies or by 
governorate/municipality  
Informal Workers  Zabaleen, Scavengers  Licensed as middlemen  
Hired by sub-contracted companies 
Non-governmental and 
Community Based Organizations 
and activists  
APE, SOY, EQI and independent 
community activists 
Offering services and trainings to the 
informal worker community.  
Establishing for-profit recycling 
operations  
Public agents Citizens Influencing policy makers 
Interaction with other stakeholders eg. 
Workers, local authorities, community 
organizations  
Investors  Cement Plants, Companies 
representing cement industry  
Using solid waste in industry as an 
energy source  
 
Table 2: Stakeholders Map in Greater Cairo (Secondary and Primary Sources) 
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III- Stakeholder Dynamics 
Ministries  
According to the literature, several Ministries share responsibility for developing policies 
and regulations at a national level regarding SWM.  The most relevant ministries are the MEA 
(Zaki et al, 2013) and former MURIS which was dissolved in 2015 (Personal communication, 
government middle management representative, 2015). The ministries role is typically issuing 
strategies and regulatory laws, after which they are handed over to local authorities to devise 
implementation plans and to follow them through. A regular monitoring on performance of local 
authorities to evaluate their adherence to policy plans is also undergone by relevant ministries 
(Personal communication, government top-ranked official, 2015). Furthermore, ministries 
explore new investment partnership opportunities, on regular basis, with external parties such as 
private sector and industry (Personal communication, government middle management 
representative, 2015). 
Due to the vast number of ministries involved, overlaps, loss of communication, 
contradictions in policy-making as well as the weakening of accountability becomes common. 
An example of this is a relocation policy the government was working on to transfer Zabaleen’s 
recycling operations and residence outside of the main city. One of the areas decided upon was a 
land in Ain Sokhna Road, 80 Km from Cairo, but it turned out to be owned to the Military so 
relocation was halted after some Zabaleen had already built houses (Personal Communication, 
top ranked government official, 2015). 
 
There are a lot of collisions happening between policies. More entities mean more 
 Complication. (Top-ranked government official, 2015). 
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Interaction and dissemination of information was reported to be essentially impaired 
between different ministries, as well. In an interview, a middle management representative of the 
government described the following incident about his attempts to correspond with another 
government body to request information: 
 
We wrote to the Ministry of Local Development several times requesting data and they 
did not reply for weeks. Eventually when they did reply, they sent us two reports, each 
contradicting the other! (Government middle management representative, 2015). 
 
With the formation of the MURIS, an additional role was adopted by the ministry which 
was originally undertaken by NGOs ie. Supporting the Zabaleen. In one of the interviews with a 
ministry representative, she reported that “improving the social image of Zabaleen” was one of 
the ministry’s goals (Personal communication, government middle-management representative, 
2015). Another representative also explained that MURIS was following in the footsteps of SOY 
by providing guidelines to Zabaleen about how to register sanitation companies (Personal 
communication, SOY NGO representative, 2015).  
 
Governmental Entities at the Local Level  
 According to an interview with a middle-management government representative, it was 
explained that in urban cities such as Cairo, local authorities are responsible for designing their 
own operational workplans to implement the national policies and regulations of the ministries.  
This, in turn, results in a diversity of applied methods from one governorate to the other 
sometimes to the point of creating lack of uniformity.   
Not all governorates in Egypt operate using the same methods. The ministry plans 
strategies but then they are left up to each individual governorate to implement through 
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their agencies. (Government middle-management representative, 2015) 
 
Implementation activities include developing work plans, contracting with service 
providing companies (national and international), issuing licenses to middlemen (personal 
communication, government middle-management representative, 2015). Modifying contracts as 
well as monitoring and inspection were also named among the duties of the local level 
government (personal communication, independent consultant, 2014). Developing dumpsites, 
transfer stations, landfills and recycling factories is evidently originally included within their 
authority although some of these tasks were delegated to the international companies contracted 
in 2002 (Personal communication, AMA Arab representative, 2014). Although not within their 
original mandate, due to the lack of a national policy to govern SWM, local authorities 
sometimes take it upon themselves to develop regulations that correspond to their local needs 
(Personal communication, private sector investor, 2015). Owing to their broad authority and 
assigned tasks, some sources interviewed perceived this to be a major obstacle in the system 
especially given the lack of a national policy to govern and unify workplans across all local 
authorities which resulted in undesirables inconsistencies. This description was given by a 
private sector investor to explain the problem from his standpoint:  
 
If I can sum up the problem of waste management in Egypt then I would say it is the 
lack of a national policy. There is no fixed pricing per ton for the waste, no tariff 
regulating waste transportation per distance…Policy is vague and therefore, each 
governor is trying to improvise and be creative. (Private sector investor, 2015). 
 
A lot has also been said about poor work standards in these local affiliations. Reports of 
incompetence, lethargy and corruption were commonly repeated by different interest groups 
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interviewed who showed great frustration with these agencies. Regarding the monitoring and 
inspection role of local authorities, several sources said that it was a common procedure that 
contracted companies would pay bribes to inspectors to change the findings of their reports. With 
such corruption carrying on for years, an adaptation to the system eventually set in and lead to 
the building of further corruption networks between local authorities and the contracted 
companies and Zabaleen (Personal Communication, Independent Consultant, 2014).  
 
Fact is, a lot of people are now benefiting from this corruption and do not wish to see it 
 end like some officials, companies and even the Zabaleen sometimes. (Independent 
 Consultant, 2014) 
 
According to a Zabaleen middleman interviewed, procedures required for acquiring 
licensing from local authorities were also not exempt of corruption. He narrates the following to 
describe a regular process of application for licensing at the local authority:  
 
When local authorities open a call for bidding among local sanitary companies to apply 
to receive a contract, selection of the winners are favorable towards companies with 
 personal connections with employees in the governorates and not based on the company 
 profile and experience.  (Zabaleen Middleman, 2014) 
 
International Service Companies 
In most secondary literature reviewed, international companies contracted in 2002 were 
considered the party most to blame in the current unsatisfactory state of MSWM in Cairo (Fahmi 
and Sutton, 2010). Primary data collected, however, indicates that there were essential errors in 
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the tendering and contracting stages of the partnership that were done by government 
representatives which contributed to the poor implementation of operations.  
Doubts were cast by the sources interviewed about the level of experience and 
competence of the local authorities’ team assigned to work on the tender for contracting a service 
provider for Greater Cairo’s SWM (Personal Communications, ERTEKAA top management 
representative, 2014). Consequently, terms of reference used in developing the contracts, were 
not optimal and left important data vague and improperly defined. An example of this is the 
street cleaning service. Several sources stated that this term did not specify how many shifts 
needed to be worked by the companies. Without identifying specific shifts, the companies and 
local authorities fell into dispute over the meaning of the term and the satisfactory outcomes of 
the activity. Local authorities expected spotless streets around the clock which meant running 
several shifts a day. Companies argued that this was not stated in the contract and that those 
services, under these conditions, would require an adjustment in fees to cover increasing 
equipment and workforce (Personal communication, AMA Arab representative, 2014). An 
independent consult who was asked to comment on the claims of AMA Arab confirmed that the 
current payment policy was indeed insufficient compared to the government’s expectations 
(Personal communication, independent consultant, 2015). He described the situation as follows: 
 
You cannot pay someone EGP 1000 for a service that costs EGP 2000 and expect  100% 
 results. If the Egyptian government wants to see better services performed by the 
 multinational companies, they have to pay them accordingly so they can finance their 
 equipment and needed labor force to make it possible. (Independent consultant, 2015) 
 
Other similar loopholes in the agreement mentioned were lack of uniformity in terms 
across contracts with different international companies, each of which was handled by the 
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respective local authority without coordination (Personal Communication, independent 
consultant, 2014) .Additionally no quota was set for recruitment of Zabaleen in the international 
companies and low/no required recycling rates were set (Personal communication, AMA Arab 
top-management representative, 2014). But perhaps the biggest contractual problem that received 
criticism from all stakeholders interviewed was the underestimation of the price of the service.  
Generally, local governments operate on small budgets so in order to finance the service; 
the ministry introduced a law enforcing sanitary fees to be added to electricity bills (Personal 
communication, Private sector investor, 2015). But because Zabaleen kept collecting waste door-
to-door even after the agreements came to force, household tenants sometimes found themselves 
paying twice for the service, once to the Zabal and another through the electricity bill. This 
resulted in many tenants not paying the sanitary fees quoted in electricity bills (Personal 
communication, Independent community activist, 2015).  With less money coming in than 
needed to be paid to the international companies, as per their contract fees, local authorities were 
left with no choice but to decrease their payments made out to the international companies 
because their budgets could not subsidize the difference. To justify paying less than they owed 
the companies, local authorities continued introducing fines and deductions in payments for 
“failure to meet required quality of service” (Personal communication, Independent consultant, 
2014). With this trend continuing, however, international companies eventually lost the ability to 
financially maintain their expensive vehicles, massive workforce and other required services 
leading to permanent deterioration of their performance (Personal communication, Independent 
Consultant, 2014). 
A top-ranked government official was asked to comment on the claims of inadequate 
pricing of the service made by other stakeholders and she admitted it was indeed under budgeted 
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compared to the required funds to offer adequate services. She further explained that the 
government was researching methods to rectify this.  
 
We (the government) were researching how to correctly price the service and how much 
 each area can pay. Our findings were that low-income areas can comfortably pay EGP 5 
 per month, but in high-income neighborhoods like Zamalek, why not pay EGP 40 per 
 month? We will have to subsidize some areas with the money collected by other areas
 (Top- ranked Government Official, 2015). 
 
It is worth mentioning that, according to the literature, current price for the service ranges 
from EGP1 to EGP10 per month (Debout, 2012). 
 
National Waste Management Companies 
Contrary to what was implied in some literature such as Fahmi and Sutton (2010) the 
Zabaleen were not excluded from SWM operations following the multinational contracts, in fact 
the system continued to rely heavily on them and on national companies, as explained by 
stakeholders interviewed. According to the partnership with the multinationals, their assignment 
was for North, East and West Cairo districts only whereas South Cairo was assigned to the local 
CCBA. This district, therefore, is operated solely by Egyptian companies (Personal 
communication, ERTEKAA top management representative, 2014). Additionally, the 
international companies working in the other three quarters of Cairo, had been subcontracting 
national companies and Zabaleen regularly to operate on their behalf (Personal Communication, 
ERTEKAA top management representative, 2014). There are currently three different types of 
national companies who receive contracts/subcontracts to operate within Greater Cairo: 
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- High to Medium size companies: Led by businessmen and operated by a labor force of 
Zabaleen (Personal Communication, ERTEKAA top management representative, 2014) 
- Medium to small size companies: Led and operated entirely by Zabaleen, where the head is 
usually an established member of the trade. The leading Zabal of such companies is known 
as a middleman among Zabaleen (personal communication, informal worker, 2014). 
Evidently, the MURIS, in addition to non-governmental organizations such as SOY 
Association, had been actively endorsing the legalization of Zabaleen activities through 
assisting them in registering as companies (personal communication, SOY NGO 
representative, 2015).  
- Small scale youth-led start-ups: In an attempt to entice informal workers and youth to start 
up companies for SWM, the Ministry of Environment announced a call for new start-up 
companies to register at local authorities to receive licenses to operate. (Personal 
communication, middle-management government representative, 2015). 
According to an interview with  a representative of the MURIS in charge of start-up waste 
management companies, the ministry’s strategy was to decentralize Greater Cairo service 
provisions by awarding small and medium companies contracts to manage smaller districts 
(Personal Communication, government middle management representative, 2015). But despite 
the ministry’s support to new start-up companies, two challenges were reported by 
representatives of such companies as major obstacles they face.  The first challenge is obtaining 
enough capital needed to finance expensive equipment and vehicles to run operations and hire 
workforce (Personal communication, informal worker, 2015). A specific benchmark could not be 
assigned for the start-up capital needed since the size of these companies varied greatly based on 
the planned scale of operations (personal communication, SOY NGO representative, 2015). The 
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second obstacle is winning contracts/subcontracts after bidding with local authorities or 
international companies. As previously mentioned, prevalence of corruption at local levels 
formed barriers of entry for newcomers. This caused the system to become selectively exclusive 
to certain companies and middlemen with strong connections within these bureaus or those who 
were willing to pay bribes in exchange of being selected (Personal communication, Informal 
Worker, 2014). One of the informal workers described the process of a middleman applying for 
licensing from a local governorate as follows: 
 
Everything in Egypt is run by bribery. For a middleman to acquire licensing to manage 
waste, he has to pay bribes to the governorate and the beautification agency. Getting the 
license is a very lucrative business ,earning him 50 to 60 thousand pounds per month so he 
pays to get in. (Informal Worker, 2014) 
 
One Zabal who had worked in the waste management trade for over 20 years told the story of 
how he decided against registering a company as follows:  
I have the money and my sons work with me so I wanted to register a company and gain  
recognition  by the legal system, but then I decided it was a very long road. It would take me 
years to understand my way around things at the local authorities and to get licensed. 
Licenses are set to certain middlemen who have been getting licensed for 20 years. It is hard 
to replace them. They have friends inside the agencies and governorates who back them and 
give them the license, because they pay them monthly bribes. The local authorities do not 
want newcomers. (Informal Worker, 2014) 
 
Aside from the evidence of malpractice in the primary data collected from different 
stakeholders, the literature seems to bare evidence of such occurrences as well. A testimony was 
published in the state-owned Al Ahram daily newspaper by a representative of a youth-led small  
start-up company who called the state’s plans to offer contracts to companies such as his as 
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“newspaper talk” ie. Meant only for publicity. This came after he applied for a service provision 
contract at the Giza governorate and was told that his request will be “buried” because they had 
already awarded contracts to three high scale companies (Salah et al, 2016). 
Although the MURIS planned for an integration of small and medium size companies, the 
localities still remained the bigger challenge given their disfavor to deal with newcomers as well 
as their wish to not be overloaded with monitoring multiple companies as opposed to fewer high 
scale companies (Personal Communication, Independent consultant, 2015).  
 
Informal Workers 
A focus group conducted with informal workers revealed a deep set anger at being 
“sidelined by the foreigners” (Focus group discussion, 7 Informal workers, 2015). Even though 
they continued being subcontracted under their management, the workers felt that those 
companies had robbed them of their autonomy to a business that was rightfully theirs. A 
commonly repeated message they were keen on delivering to defend their pride is that 
multinational companies could not work without them. As one of them put it: 
 
The big companies could not work until they brought in the sons of the trade. We are the 
ones who know everything about it.  (Informal worker, 2014). 
 
In response to what they perceived as an attack on their livelihood, the Zabaleen 
reportedly “fought back” against the system. During his interview, an independent consultant 
gave the following account describing how he perceived the Zabaleen’s reaction towards the 
multinational-led system: 
 
  58   
 
When they (the government) excluded the Zabaleen from direct operations run by the 
multinational companies, the Zabaleen fought back by trying to sabotage the system 
using the weapons of the weak…Weapons of the weak is a theory that states that less 
powerful agents are able to subvert plans of more powerful agents. They drag their feet, 
they sabotage, they pilfer, by all kinds of activities that subvert without direct 
confrontation. (Independent consultant, 2015) 
 
Several testimonies from other stakeholders, though sympathizing with Zabaleen, 
narrated stories of poor work ethics on their part such as tricking a fellow Zabal to take over his 
job with a foreign companies (Personal communication, impendent consultant, 2014), dumping 
waste that they collected from households in the streets after taking the valuables and inciting 
violence against newcomers to the trade such as start-ups (Personal Communication, 
Independent community activist, 2015). Some behaviors were even admitted by Zabaleen 
themselves. Stories included incidents of scavenging through waste piles and dumping the 
remainder in the streets, not showing up to collect from a household for days on purpose if the 
tenant offends them and lack of abiding by inspection rules. These were actions described by 
Zabaleen themselves (focus group discussion, 7 informal workers, 2015). One Zabal described 
an interaction that had taken place between him and a tenant who scoffed at him for not coming 
on time the day before. The Zabal felt his pride had been bruised and punished the tenant by 
disappearing for a week. The Zabal said:  
I did not go to collect his garbage for days. I let it pile up in his house so he would be 
forced to take it to the streets himself. He is the one who will suffer when I do not come 
for a few days, not me.  (Informal worker, 2014) 
 
One community activist who worked for many years among the Zabaleen community and 
represented their interests during public meetings also expressed frustration at some negative 
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actions that she perceived from Zabaleen. These actions, as she described them, led to adverse 
effects on the reputation of Zabaleen in general and to the collective good of the profession. 
Following is an incident she narrated: 
 
When the land in Ain Sokhna was first assigned for Zabaleen to relocate in, some of 
them rushed to build houses there, even before the order was officially approved. They 
did this while knowing that the location was too far from the heart of Cairo and that 
SWM operations could not be sustained if they relocated there. They did not care. They 
wanted the land because it was an investment opportunity for them, nothing else. The true 
Zabaleen who cared about their profession ofcourse refused to relocate because they 
knew it is too far. (Community activist, 2015) 
 
But despite the evidence of malpractice by some Zabaleen, the theory that Zabaleen may 
have been deliberately hindering operations does not agree with the rest of the findings. Based on 
testimonies from different parties, the low outcomes of collection were caused by a number of 
different factors, several of which were beyond the Zabaleen’s control. One such factor is the 
poor state of the city’s dumpsites and transfer stations. A Representative of AMA Arab Italian 
company as well as a representative of an Egyptian local company both complained that the 
government was shutting down dumpsites and transfer stations regularly, relocating them 
without prior notice and not maintaining them properly. Zabaleen also said that some dumpsites 
were sold to the international companies to be exclusively used by them (Personal 
communication, Informal worker, 2014). Without securing a place to dump the waste, this meant 
forcing service providers to illegally dump the waste outside of the authorized areas.  
Following is an account by one of the middlemen and one of the Zabaleen about the kind 
of trouble they go through, sometimes, to dispose their collected waste: 
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Dumpsites keep getting shut down. And some of them have been taken over by out-laws 
and thugs. They make us pay fees to dump our trucks. The government sold the dumpsites 
to the international private companies and that way it becomes exclusive to them. 
(Informal worker, 2015) 
 
When we do not find dumpsites, we go to transfer stations. These are owned by the 
governorates, but these are very small and do not have enough capacity. They are 
supposed to be emptied daily but they are not. I pay a monthly fee of EGP 100 to get 
access to transfer stations but sometimes I go and find that it is closed! Sometimes we 
roam the streets from place to place searching for somewhere to dump our waste. If we 
cannot empty our trucks, we cannot go out next day to collect. Sometimes we find no 
alternative but to go to the hills to dump the garbage there but it is risky because there 
are thugs and they are armed.  One time, they stabbed a colleague and tried to steal his 
truck. (Middleman, 2014). 
 
Another factor that heavily affected collection was banning pigs rearing in 2009. In 
addition, there are no arrangements made with fertilizing factories to transfer the organic part to 
them, instead of dumping it since (Personal communication, Informal worker, 2014).  Evidently, 
Cairo has several fertilizing plants but they face challenges to operate at full capacity. Firstly, 
they are said to be very old and in need of upgrading (Personal communication, Private sector 
investor, 2015), secondly, they need to secure continuous high quantities of pure organic waste 
to maintain operations which is rarely available, and lastly, they are located at far distances from 
the heart of the city which means extra transportation costs to be paid by the collector (Personal 
Communication, independent consultant, 2014).  
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To sum up, although there was undoubtedly poor behavior practiced by Zabaleen, the 
ability to assign responsibility to them would only be possible had these actions been taking 
place in an environment that allowed for otherwise.  
With uncollected garbage persisting in the streets, scavenging started increasing among 
Zabaleen which harmed their image. A high-ranked government official describes how 
scavenging is negatively affecting Zabaleen in the following quote: 
 
Zabal became a part-time scavenger. While on his way home, he’d stop by and pick 
through a few containers. But he is not originally a scavenger, so his job and social 
status deteriorated. He used to be a son of a trade called waste collection, now he turned 
into a part-time scavenger who people do not know and think of as a criminal unlike 
Zabaleen who people never saw as criminals. To people, Zabaleen were workers, they 
knew the face of their Zabal who was coming to their homes for years. But a scavenger is 
unknown. He could be anything, an addict, a thug, anything.  (High-ranked government 
official, 2015). 
 
When this high-ranked official was asked what she thought ought to be done with 
scavengers, she said they should be integrated in the system as they were even poorer than 
Zabaleen and needed a job, but that both Zabaleen and scavengers needed to formalize their trade 
by forming companies to earn respect and achieve social status. (Personal Communication, top-
ranked government official, 2015). 
Regarding their opinion of forming companies, and organization in general, Zabaleen’s 
replies were favorable. It was sensed that pride is generally a pivotal issue for these workers and 
their outlook to formalizing into a company seemed synonymous with status and dignity in 
addition to better income and autonomy. Nonetheless, most of them seemed unwilling to burden 
  62   
 
themselves with the required procedures for formalizing into companies and seemed content to 
maintain an informal status (Focus group discussion, 7 informal workers, 2015). 
 
Non-governmental and Community Organizations/Activists  
The earliest non-governmental organizations involved in waste management started out 
as a venue to support the Zabaleen community who lived in poverty and amidst the garbage. The 
EQI, established in 1981 as a company, was one of the very first entities in Cairo with an 
outreach targeting developing the Zabaleen community (Personal communication, independent 
consultant, 2015). EQI realized the need for Zabaleen to be a formal entity when presenting 
themselves to local authorities to be able to reflect the image of a professional labor force. For 
this reason, one of their earliest programs, funded by The World Bank, aimed at finding an entity 
that they can represent them (Personal communication, independent consultant, 2015). This 
project later progressed into an attempt to develop the waste management process as a whole 
with recycling as its main focus. With that aim, APE was established by Yousriya Loza-Sawiris 
(Personal communication, independent consultant, 2015), in 1984 to introduce methods of 
improving SWM in addition to providing services and capacity building to Zabaleen (APE 
website). The association established a compost plant to make use of the organic waste with the 
help of the Zabaleen and the pigs that they raised. They also provided training for the Zabaleen 
about methods of recycling (Personal communication, independent consultant, 2015). 
In a visit to the compositing and recycling plant in Kattamiya district in Eastern Cairo, 
owned by APE, the association representatives explained how well sorted pure organic waste and 
pigs were key to achieving a high quality product. They complained of having a hard time 
replacing pigs which were crucial to the composting process. According to the explanation of the 
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plant workers, the organic waste was fed to the pigs and their manure used in manufacturing 
compost which served as an organic fertilizer (Personal communication, APE NGO 
representative, 2014). What makes pigs different than other animals is that they not only feed on 
organic waste but that they can also digest pieces of plastic and stones contaminating the organic 
portion, thereby, eliminating impurities that affect the end product (Sarant, 2010). Without pigs, 
the alternative would be to invest in long hours of hand sorting to separate organic waste that has 
no contamination by inorganic parts before feeding it to animals such as goats. This was a 
lengthy and costly process for manufacturers (Personal communication, APE NGO 
representative, 2014). 
Before the government banned pigs, the association used to keep pig farms for the 
Zabaleen in Kattamiya. Every day, after Zabaleen would finish collecting the garbage, they 
would hand sort it, take out the inorganic recyclables for reselling and then transport the organic 
part to Kattamiya to feed to their pigs. The arrangement worked well for everyone. The Zabaleen 
made a profit from selling pig meat and the compost plant benefited from using the pigs’ manure 
in manufacture. The association even covered transportation fees to entice Zabaleen to keep their 
pig farms in Kattamiya (Personal communication, APE NGO representative, 2014). The 
association was also active in offering vocational training programs, healthcare and other 
services to the Zabaleen community. 
As a predominantly Christian community, Zabaleen had practiced pig farming for 
decades which was rare in a country with Islamic majority (Fahmi and Sutton, 2010).  It was 
only in 2009, that the government decided to slaughter all 300,000 pigs they owned for fear of a 
swine flu spread. The Zabaleen were very financially set back by the decision and suspected that 
it was sectarian in nature (Kingsley, 2014).  
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Following the pigs slaughtering, APE tried to replace them with other animals such as 
goats or an imported brand of worms but neither had the expected outcomes to make the process 
cost-effective (Personal communication, APE NGO representative, 2014). 
On the subject of the current legal standing of pig farming, a top-ranked government 
official interviewed advised that she had found no written authorization for the pigs’ slaughtering 
and prohibition order in 2009 and seems to believe that the order was communicated orally by 
the president. As a result, she initiated a process to re-allow them through the MURIS; a decision 
which she said many officials avoided taking for fear of religious stigma (Personal 
communication, top-ranked official, 2015). It is worth noting, at this point, that this official is a 
member of the Christian community in Egypt which may have made the decision less difficult 
for her. 
Following the issue of the decision to re-allow pig rearing, compost manufacturers, such 
as APE still felt apprehensive about resuming pig rearing again for the fear that another ministry 
would override the authorization and they would be asked to slaughter the pigs again thereby 
losing their investment. After that stage the MURIS was dissolved and the subject was never 
settled (Personal communication, top-ranked government representative, 2015).  
 
Spirit of Youth  
Sprit of Youth NGO was founded in 2004 by Dr. Laila Iskander (SOY). This NGO aimed 
at building Zabaleen as a powerful group through organizing, establishing a labor union and 
helping Zabaleen register companies (personal communication, independent consultant, 2015). 
The subject of getting informal workers to organize was named as a challenge by one of the 
independent consultant interviewed.  
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It needs a lot of community work to get the Zabaleen to organize themselves and be one 
unit. We did it before in the 1980s and the 1990s with EQI. It was only later when Laila 
Iskander created Spirit of Youth and she took over representing the Zabaleen that they 
created the union/syndicate. I think it is possible to do but the Zabaleen themselves are 
not going to be the ones to be able to do it on their own. An NGO needs to be a catalyst, 
an intermediately agent that can function well in an informal community and also in a 
formal bureaucracy. (Independent Consultant, 2015) 
 
With the success of SOY and Laila Iskander’s prominent role as a representative of 
Zabaleen, she was appointed as Minister of Environment in 2013 and later became the Minister 
in the newly formed MURIS in 2014, indicating the government’s shift towards returning to 
work with Zabaleen after the multinational agreements expire (Personal communication, middle-
management MEA representative, 2015).  This is an account by a representative of the MEA 
regarding Laila Iskander, during her time as minister of the MURIS: 
 
Policies are not implemented well because it is NGOs that control the waste collection 
through Zabaleen. Policies did not take this sector into account, before; Marginalized 
Zabaleen who have been working in the field for years. Zabaleen are still ignored during 
policy making. What we liked about Dr. Laila Iskander is that she was doing this. She 
was including them and solving this problem. (MEA middle-management representative, 
2015). 
 
MURIS indeed had plans to incorporate NGOs into the SWM, after 2017, with the aim of 
providing further monitoring and evaluation of operations alongside the local authorities. The 
plan was to form a joint committee for the inspection formed of representatives of MURIS, the 
governorate/local authority and a local NGO to share responsibility for the process (Personal 
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communication, government middle-management representative, 2015). As previously 
mentioned, a lot of corruption was detected in the monitoring and inspection process. This is 
how a government representative described their plans to tackle the issue: 
  
We have assigned an NGO in each neighborhood to be responsible for monitoring and 
inspection alongside the directorate personnel. An NGO was assigned to each 
neighborhood. We found a lot of bad practices taking place through the directorate 
employees who would submit good reviews for collection companies in exchange for 
bribes. For this reason the government could not be left alone to monitor and evaluate. 
He had just selected and assigned the NGOs for each directorate when they dissolved the 
ministry. (Middle Management Government Representative, 2015) 
 
Another point worth noting, at this stage, is that the Egyptian government has been 
increasingly restrictive of civil society activity since 2011 (UCNL, 2016). Barriers to financial 
resources, activities and international contracting have all been increasing which places 
limitations on NGOs (Ibid). With endorsement of the plan by the government, however, it was 
not expected that this would be a limiting factor.  
Eventually the MURIS did not last long to see their plans through and several 
stakeholders believe the reason for the ministry’s dissolution was Laila Iskander herself who, as 
one interviewee described her, “stepped on many toes” (Personal communication, Independent 
Consultant, 2015). Another government representative attributed the reason to the government 
who was “impatient to see fast results of reform” (Personal Communication, middle-
management Representative, 2015). 
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Citizens 
The citizens of Greater Cairo have had much influence over the MSWM system for 
years. During his interview, the representative of AMA Arab Company said that he believed the 
heavy fines his company was receiving were influenced by public pressure more than any other 
thing. He said: 
To the government, waste is not considered as an investment, but a matter of public 
opinion (AMA Arab top management representative, 2014).  
 
Indeed, different sources agreed that public opinion carried much weight for officials and 
policy makers. For instance, MURIS representatives said they planned to return to door-to-door 
collection and to a system run by Zabaleen in response to the requests of the citizens (Personal 
communication, government middle-management representative, 2015).  
Fear of stirring public unrest was also named by the AMA Arab representative as one of 
the reasons the government did not enforce laws to penalize throwing trash in the streets 
(Personal communication, AMA Arab top management representative, 2014). Others, however, 
considered this to be a result of inadequate street equipping and collection rather than fear of the 
people. One independent consultant said: 
 
The government cannot fine people for throwing trash in the streets when they do not 
provide baskets for them to throw it in and make sure they are emptied regularly 
(Personal communication, independent consultant, 2014). 
 
Other, less direct, ways in which citizens were greatly influencing MSWM in Cairo are 
their waste disposal habits, especially regarding not segregating their garbage before collection. 
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During her interview, a top ranked official stressed the government’s plans to introduce 
segregation at source as an important aspect of the post-2017 strategic plans. Another 
government representative also explained that they planned to encourage segregation at source 
by awarding credit points to the tenant’s ration smart card based on performance. In 2014 the 
Egyptian government started the Ration smart cards system where card holders would be entitled 
to a fixed ration of subsidized bread, rice, cooking oil and sugar (Ahmed, 2014). According to 
the ministry’s plan, awareness about segregation at source would be delivered to the households 
through their garbage collector and their performance was to be monitored by him, upon which 
entitlement to credit points would be determined (Personal communication, government middle-
management representative, 2015). 
The subject of involving the public in decision making, as well, to request shared 
responsibility is endorsed as an effective tool by secondary sources and expected to yield 
successful results by several stakeholders interviewed. For instance, regarding the willingness of 
public citizens to partake actively in segregation at source, three initiatives were identified by the 
sources interviewed that support its probability of success. Following is a brief account of three 
case studies for segregation at source projects: 
Case 1: Pilot Project. APE- Ford Foundation, 1990s 
This comprised a pilot project implemented in the 1990s by APE with funds from Ford 
Foundation with the aim of spreading awareness about segregation at source within the 
community (Personal communication, independent consultant, 2015). The targeted locations 
were Manial, Der Al Malak, Maadi and Basateen. These districts ranged between high to low 
income areas. The project activities included conducting awareness campaigns about the benefits 
of segregation at source and distributing free colored garbage bags and baskets to the households 
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so they can segregate dry inorganic refuse from organic food remains. The outcomes of the 
project were said to be highly successful which led to an extension of the project (Personal 
communication, independent consultant, 2015). About the difference in public reaction to the 
concept in low and high income neighborhoods, an independent consultant said: 
 
The outcomes in lower income areas were expectedly lower because the topic was new 
and because the educational level was limited, but what we discovered is that these 
simple people will follow your instructions if they trust you, even if they cannot 
completely understand what you are doing.– (Personal communication, independent 
consultant, 2015). 
 
Case Study 2: Poverty Alleviation and Enhancement of Environmental Conditions in the Haram 
City. APE – Sawiris Foundation, 2013 
The project is titled “Poverty Alleviation and Enhancement of Environmental Conditions 
in the Haram City Project - Phase II” implemented by APE in Haram City district – 6th of 
October, Cairo with funds from the Sawiris Foundation for Social Development. This project ran 
between 2013 till 2015, with raising awareness about segregation at source as one of its main 
missions. Regarding the outcomes achieved, the following was narrated by a member of the 
project team: 
 
The women in the households were very enthusiastic. They wanted to show the APE team 
that they understood the instructions and were actively involved in caring for the 
cleanliness of their street. ..it helped that the project team were all residents of the same 
poor area as the tenants. They know who we are and they know we are not outsiders. 
(Personal communication, APE NGO representative, 2015) 
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Case Study 3: “Sell your trash”. Governorate of Giza – Youth activists, 2014 
The third case studied was a youth-led initiative, supported by the Giza governorate, and 
led by a group of community activist who lived in the Giza neighborhood of Faisal. The 
initiative was called “Sell your trash” and was implemented in Faisal, a low-middle income 
neighborhood, in 2014. At this time the ministry of environment had announced its endorsement 
to youth-led projects and allocated funds to youth-led start ups working in waste management 
(Al Shorouk, 2015). The project leader was interviewed and following is an account of the 
project and findings: 
 
The plan was to teach households to segregate their garbage, and then allow them to sell 
their own recyclables to dealers whom we brought to the neighborhood once a week to 
meet the tenants. We made a market day event once a week. The plan went successfully 
and the households were happy to be making money from recycling their garbage but the 
project angered the Zabaleen who came and made fights with the tenants and the dealers. 
(Personal communication, Independent community activist, 2015).  
 
In short, citizens have the power to affect the MSWM system through influencing policy 
makers to introduce more favorable policies. Policy makers also have the power of enforcing 
laws needed to govern the system but they need to make necessary tools and facilities available 
to the public before bringing such laws to force. Finally, there is evidence to support the ability 
to engage citizens actively in the segregation at source system. This, however, depends on 
spreading awareness, making tools of segregation available, introducing incentives or 
compensations, building trust and engaging other stakeholders expected to be affected by the 
process such as waste collectors.   
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Investors  
In the recent years, the recycling market has been expanding in Egypt due to the need to 
find fossil fuel alternatives for energy. One of the industries interested in exploring waste-to-
energy possibilities is the cement industry which globally relies on coal followed by refused 
derived fuels (RDF) (Personal communication, private sector investor, 2015). RDF technology is 
a method that uses incineration of municipal waste as a means to produce energy. It requires 
removal of inorganic recyclables and any hazardous waste while leaving only combustible 
materials with a high caloric value such organic food waste, paper, plastic and wood (GAIA, 
2013).  
Similar to the composting industry, the two problems facing production of RDF in Egypt 
are securing the required quantity and quality of segregated waste and the second is financing the 
system in a way that makes it cost effective (Personal communication, independent consultant 
2015).  
Due to poor collection, scavenging and lack of segregation at source in homes, the 
industry faces challenges in the quality and quantity of the waste it receives from the 
government.  
 
If investors find a good quantity of waste that was not scavenged, in this case the investor 
can pay a good price to the government to buy the waste and thereby contribute to 
financing the city’s waste management. (Private sector investor, 2015). 
 
Some suggestions offered by the company to protect waste from scavenging, is to place 
waste in locked underground waste containers. This method had previously been introduced in 
the Mediterranean coastal city of Alexandria and has succeeded in keeping the waste untouched 
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(Personal communication, private sector investor, 2015). Another recommendation given was 
law enforcement to penalize throwing waste, and also integrating scavengers into the official 
waste management system to combat random waste picking (Personal communication, private 
sector investor, 2015). 
The second challenge for recycling in industry is devising a cost-effective financial 
framework. Industry representatives usually find the price of the waste quoted by the 
governorates to purchase it too high and think that governorates ought to shift their perspective 
from trying to make a profit off businessmen to endorsing methods of waste treatment that limit 
dumping or land filling (Personal communication, private sector investor, 2015). It is also 
notable that coal is a cheaper source of energy for such industries but its availability in Egypt is 
limited which prompts them to search for alternative options (Personal communication, private 
sector investor, 2015). The following two quotes represent the challenge perceived by a private 
sector investor for reaching a financial agreement with the government on the price of buying 
waste for energy production.  
 
A mis-used phrase in Egypt is “Waste is a treasure”. Actually waste is not a treasure. 
There needs to be a lot invested in garbage collection for it to become useful. (Private 
sector investor, 2015). 
 
All governorates have deficits in their waste management budgets, so they welcome 
investment options and try to make as much out of the investor as possible so they can 
cover their deficit…But the current financial situation of recycling does not allow an 
investor to also pay for waste. When you calculate the recycling budget and the profit 
made from selling produced RDF versus the price of coal, it doesn’t work. Cement 
factories have cheaper options to revert to. (Private sector investor, 2015). 
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Government representatives are, however, not convinced of this argument and think the 
waste should be sold to investors at a “proper” price. When asked to comment on the private 
sector investor’s complaints of the high asking price offered him by the government to buy 
waste, a top-ranking official said:  
 
Businessmen want to take the trash free of charge. All cement factories want to either 
take it free of charge or pay negligible prices. If they price the garbage properly, and account 
for transportation fees, waste collectors will deliver the quantity and quality they need. That is 
the guarantee. (Top-ranked Government Official, 2015). 
 
But aside from disagreement about their financial philosophy, the official seemed to 
support the approach of industry’s attempts to use waste-to-energy technologies and believed 
that if Reliance Investments managed to make it work, that it could be the “kick off” to solving 
waste management problems (Personal communication, top-ranking government official, 2015). 
 
Summary of The Stakeholders Analysis 
 
The MSWM system relies on several stakeholders and participants. National and local 
governmental levels are responsible for legal frameworks, implementation and monitoring. 
International and national private service companies are contracted by the government or 
subcontracted as the party responsible for managing solid waste in Cairo. These companies are 
heavily dependent on Zabaleen, however, some Zabaleen prefer not to join companies and prefer 
maintaining their informal status and partake in heavily criticized scavenging activities. NGOs 
and community activists have long been active in the waste workers’ communities, offering them 
services and empowerment programs. In addition they executed several programs to endorse 
environmentally-friendly waste management methods such as recycling, composting and 
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segregation at source. Aside from being the producer of waste, citizens play an important role in 
influencing policy and participating in technologies that can greatly enhance SWM such as 
segregation at source. Another stakeholder that has a potentially important role in developing 
environmentally sustainable solutions to waste management is the cement industry through its 
interest in waste-to-energy.  
The stakeholders have identified the key areas of concern that need addressing in order to 
ensure reform of SWM in Cairo. The lack of a national policy plan and the general distribution 
of responsibility between many governmental entities were named as major challenges. This 
division in the policy and institutional framework has reportedly caused a lack of uniformity in 
implementation at the local level and led to decreased accountability, competency and 
communication between parties. It was also expected to hinder future efforts for reform if 
maintained as is. Another major challenge detected relates to deficits in financial resources 
which led to loss of ability to appropriately sustain the different management stages and 
undertake necessary maintenance to dumpsites, transfer stations, recycling facilities and pay 
service providers. Management of human resources also seems to face a dilemma as the highest 
work force in Cairo ie. Waste collectors remain mostly divided and without representation under 
a legal umbrella which is a pre-requisite for the government to contract them as service 
providers. Zabaleen, however, do not seem to understand this and sometimes hinder their own 
profession by participating in actions that further divide them or cast doubts on their 
professionalism. 
Fortunately, government representatives interviewed have communicated their intentions 
to attend to most of these issues within their post-2017 plans which will be analyzed in the next 
chapter.  
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Chapter 5: Cairo’s Policy Reform Recommendations Based on Lessons 
Learned from Brazil 
 
 As seen from the previous sections of the study, the beginnings of MSWM in Cairo and 
the urban cities of Brazil bare a great resemblance in their reliance on an informal poverty-
stricken sector that lived off recycling (Dias and Alves, 2008). Brazil’s informal sector was 
mostly despised and considered illegal outcasts, however, a group of them managed to gain 
substantial recognition for their profession and currently have partnership agreements with the 
government (Sheridan et al, 2012). The elements of success for the Brazilian waste pickers were 
their ability to organize themselves and gain recognition for their trade (Fergutz et al, 2012). The 
ongoing support of civil society organizations (Dias and Alves, 2008), in addition to their ability 
to align their interests with the interests of citizens (Martina El Al, 2012). Another factor that 
gave the MSWM system of Brazil coherence is the presence of a national policy plan that took 
into account the aspects of environmental, financial and stakeholder diversity (Sheridan El Al, 
2012). The national policy set universal regulations for the country yet allowed flexibility for 
each local authority to devise its own waste management plan (Ibid).  
The primary data collected in Cairo has identified a set of interventions planned by the 
Egyptian government to optimize MWSM following the expiration of its agreements with 
international service providers in 2017 (Eco Con Serv, 2009). In this chapter, an in-depth 
analysis of each policy plan is given in terms of benefits, challenges and recommended actions. 
The analysis draws on the lessons learned from the research results in Cairo and the secondary 
literature reviewed of Brazil’s successful model.  
Following is a brief of the policy reforms potentially being planned by the Egyptian 
government. Each policy is reviewed comparatively analyzed against findings.  
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Policy Reform Planned 
Current Status 
Brazil – Urban Cities 
Current Status 
Egypt – Greater Cairo 
Policy and legal framework   
National policy for SWM issued in 2010 to 
regulate technical, economic and 
environmental measures 
No national policy. Strategy and 
regulation divided among several 
laws, each regulating an individual 
aspect 
Institutional framework  
Local municipalities develop local legal 
framework of action. National policy used as 
reference. 
- Many ministries develop strategy 
and regulations at national level 
- Newly established Waste 
Management Regulatory Agency 
is current sole authority  
- Local authorities implement 
based on national strategy 
Service Provision  Contracts    
Between local municipalities and national 
waste picker organizations/private sector 
Between local authorities and 
international companies + national 
companies/Zabaleen 
Financial Framework   Regulated by national policy 
- Law # 10 of 2005 enforcing 
service fees via electricity bills 
- Multinational agreements, each 
quoting separate service prices  
Waste-to-Energy Investment Endorsed and regulated by national policy Absence of specific regulation 
Corruption at local level  
Some detected in the form of unequal service 
fees dispersed by municipalities to service 
providers 
Highly detected in contracting, 
monitoring and inspection stages 
Pigs farming for composting Allowed and endorsed 
Banned by oral communication. No 
official law issued. 
Waste segregation at source 
Applied to endorse recycling. Waste pickers 
spread awareness to households. 
Sporadically applied through NGOs 
and community initiatives  
 
Table 3: Current Status of Policy Plans Brazil’s Urban Cities vs. Cairo (Primary and Secondary data) 
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5.1 Comparative Analysis of Government’s Reform Plan for Cairo vs. Brazil’s 
Case Study 
 
I- A Sole Authority for National SWM 
Status in Cairo 
Currently, there are several ministries that oversee SWM at the national level (Zaki et al, 
2013). During the last few years there have been attempts to assign one entity the sole 
responsibility of MSWM, the most prominent were the MURIS in 2014 (EIP, 2014), followed by 
the Waste Management Regulatory Agency in 2015 (EEAA, 2015).  
Status in Brazil 
Authority over MSWM in Brazil’s case is assigned to the local municipalities. Their 
policies are, however, governed by a supreme national policy plan that maintains uniformity 
across the country (Sheridan et al, 2012).  
Benefits of the suggested policy reform 
Although the reason why the MURIS was dissolved and how the new Agency will 
operate differently is not clear, there is no doubt that keeping things limited to one national 
authority is an important step as it will limit scattering of responsibility, miscommunication and 
increase accountability (Personal communication, top-ranked government official, 2015).  
Challenges of the suggested policy reform 
As advised by the government representatives, the ministry faced problems of frequent 
delayed response from other ministries, inaccurate data and policies being overridden after 
issuance. An example of this is the decision taken to relocate Zabaleen to Ain Al Sokhna which 
was later canceled for lack of clearance by the military forces (Personal Communication, top-
ranked government official, 2015).  Facing similar problems is highly predictable for the new 
Waste Management Regulatory Agency. 
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Recommendations  
Centralizing governance at the national level within one SWM entity is a step towards 
reform. However, for the Agency to be successful, the elements of power and financial 
independence assigned to it by Decree # 3005 of 2015 need to be fully implemented (EEAA, 
2015). It is also important to communicate the government expectations clearly to the Agency 
including the reason why previous authorities were dissolved in order to avoid a similar fate. 
 
II- Contracting with National Companies  
Status in Cairo 
Based on the poor reviews of the multinational privatization partnership (Eco Con Serv , 
2009), government representatives have already taken steps towards recruiting Zabaleen 
represented by legal companies (Personal Communication, top-ranked government official, 
2015).  The re-integration plans will include Zabaleen who have acquired legal status by 
registering a company for sanitary services and have proper vehicles and labor force. (Personal 
communication, government middle-management representative, 2015).  
Status in Brazil 
65% of the current Brazilian MSWM model is managed by local authorities and national 
waste picker networks and cooperatives manage the remaining 35% of services. (Sheridan et al, 
2012). The legalization of the cooperatives’ work through these partnership models have also 
helped them acquire funds to develop their operations (Dias and Alves, 2008). It is perhaps 
because of the availability of such models of cooperation with the government that waste picker 
cooperatives and organizations keep increasing with time (Martina El Al, 2012). 
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Benefits of the suggested policy reform 
The proposed system will make use of existing human resources of well trained and 
experienced Zabaleen and will also provide opportunities for newcomers into the business.  
Challenges of the suggested policy reform 
Several challenges can be anticipated within this workplan. Following is a summary of 
them: 
- Corruption in local authorities that are responsible for contracting with new entities may 
prevent newcomers from acquiring contracts (Personal Communication, Informal worker, 
2014).  
- The announced eligibility criteria for the national companies that can bid to receive local 
contracts seem inconsistent. MURIS and MEA had previously announced that they 
encourage small scale start-ups to apply for contracts (Personal Communication, top-ranked 
government official, 2015). On the ground, however, this is somewhat misleading as local 
authorities prefer to deal only with high scale entities to decrease the number of companies 
they need to monitor (Personal Communication, independent consultant, 2014). After all, 
this was one of the reasons why the government entered the multinational privatization plan 
in 2002. Additionally, the manager of the Waste Management Regulatory Agency 
announced their plans for large scale national companies to receive contracts, not smaller 
companies (Salah et al, 2016).  
- It was previously stated that companies run by Zabaleen do not offer street sweeping and 
cleaning services. Again, this was one of the reasons why international private companies 
were previously contracted (Personal Communication, independent consultant, 2014). In the 
event that the new Egyptian Zabaleen-led companies will not be providing this service, they 
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may find themselves being excluded in favor of other entities that do unless these companies 
are willing to uptake these services.  
Recommendations 
The plan is sound as it combines inclusion of the informal sector but within a legal 
framework that will entice them to organize into companies. Some recommended actions to 
respond to expected challenges are: 
- To limit favoritism and unethical practices at the local level, the Waste Management 
Regulatory Agency needs to apply close monitoring to the database of bidders applying for 
contracts at the local authorities including reasons why one entity is chosen instead of 
another. For the long term, an anti-corruption plan needs to be developed and enforced at the 
local level. A suggested framework for this will be provided at a later stage.  
- Building trust with stakeholders is crucial for a new entity like the Waste Management 
Regulatory Agency, for this reason, it is highly recommended to devise a visibility and 
accountability plan starting with announcing one unified set of criteria for Egyptian 
enterprises wishing to bid for a contract. If the Agency plans for only companies of a certain 
scale to be contracted, then it is preferable to announce it clearly than to maintain an 
unreasonable message that the system welcomes small and medium enterprises when there is 
no intention of recruiting them.  
 
III- Adjusting the Financial Framework 
Status in Cairo 
Of all the reasons that have been attributed to the negative outcomes of Cairo’s SWM 
operations under the multinational agreements , the one that all sources interviewed considered 
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to be the primary cause is incorrect budgeting and financial forecasting done by the government. 
As a result of inaccurate estimation, a gap of an approximately 35% deficit has resulted in the 
budget allocated for Cairo (Eco Con Serv, 2009). For this reason, amending the financial 
framework is quite pivotal to the success for all stages of SWM policy reform. So far, however, 
not much has been disclosed about how the new pricing is being set, what services will include 
and how funds will be generated or allocated.  
According to the interview conducted with a top-ranked government official the new 
system planned on increasing the tariff paid by citizens for waste management, with high income 
areas paying more than lower income areas. The new adjustment, however is still being 
researched, and there has not been much announced about it officially yet.  
Status in Brazil 
The Brazilian model also witnessed a wide discrepancy in its pricing system, essentially 
with trading recyclables where dealers would be paying official administrators 300% the price 
offered to waste pickers (Fergutz et al, 2012).  One of the reforms addressed in the  national 
policy plan issued in 2010 was setting forth a financial support plan for waste cooperatives and 
networks that manage solid waste recycling in order to endorse the activity against land filling 
(Sheridan et al, 2012) 
Benefits of the suggested policy reform 
The benefit of increasing the fees for the service means higher revenues to the system 
which will allow for covering the actual cost of the service, therefore improving its outcomes. 
Only when securing a cost-effective remuneration to service providers will collection services 
improve, which is the first key to remaining management stages. Also, because local authorities 
operate on small budgets (Personal Communication, private sector investor, 2014). It is difficult 
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to keep regular maintenance of dump sites, landfills, transfer stations and public recycling 
factories, most of which are evidently in a poor state as mentioned by several sources 
interviewed. Upgrading these locations where transfer of the unrecyclable end waste occurs is 
crucial, otherwise, there will be the risk that collectors will be forced to leave the waste in the 
streets.  
Challenges of the suggested policy reform 
Although it is considered one of the most needed changes, it is, on the other hand, the 
most challenging. Egyptian economy is currently not at its best, with GDP reaching no higher 
than 2.2% in 2014 and an inflation of 10.4% in 2015 (World Bank Website). To make matters 
more difficult, the Egyptian cabinet introduced a reform bill in July 2014 with the aim of phasing 
out energy subsidies over a course of 5 years ie. The price of all domestically consumed goods 
and services has increased and will keep getting higher (Griffin et al, 2016). Within these 
conditions, the government may be hesitant to introduce more inflation in the price of services 
which may cause them to favor holding out on complete reform till the economy recovers. This, 
consequently, implies a continuation of the status quo.  
Another concern is accurate forecasting while taking risk into account and planning 
necessary mitigation actions.  
Recommendation 
Due to the sensitivity of the issue, the government needs to start maintaining visibility 
with the public about the real reasons the management under international companies has not 
been successful. So far, multinational companies and the exclusion of Zabaleen have borne the 
brunt of it in the media; a tactic devised to divert the responsibility off of the government’s 
miscalculation of the budget. This was proven by testimonies of different stakeholders 
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interviewed, some of whom represented the government. To rectify that will require some 
investment in time and effort to convey the accurate picture as is and to build trust again.  
There is evidence to suggest that the citizens may be willing to pay more for a better 
service. Following the Jan 2011 revolution, there were many community-led volunteering 
campaigns executed for street cleaning. Citizens would be seen cleaning their neighborhoods 
using equipment purchased from personal resources (Salman, 2012). These campaigns 
eventually phased out, however, they are evidence that people are indeed willing to exert money 
and effort in exchange for an efficient MSWM system.  
The second recommendation relates to the need of setting a national policy plan for SWM 
prior to the budgeting stage. The Waste Management Regulatory Agency needs first to determine 
the national strategy it pursues because that will be translated into finances ie. What collection 
rates are we targeting? How much recycling of the waste do we plan to achieve vs. how much is 
to be dumped/land filled. What is the maximum distance to relocate informal workers’ 
operations for transportation of waste to remain cost-effective vs. leaving it uncollected?..etc.  
 
IV- Exploring Investment Opportunities  
Status in Cairo 
Before its dissolution, the MURIS was engaging with the cement industry to explore 
means of collaboration (Personal Communication, government middle-management 
representative, 2015). This resulted in a partnership agreement signed between Reliance 
Investments and the governorate of Ismailya for the establishment of a RDF and compost plant 
to be fed with local municipal waste collected from households (Al Badawy, 2015 ) 
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Status in Brazil 
In its attempts to limit land disposal, the Brazilian national policy plan of 2010 included 
elaborate endorsement of waste-to-energy technologies in industry and even went as far as to 
include an article that makes recycling and re-use compulsory for some industries (Sheridan et 
al, 2012) 
Benefits of the suggested policy reform 
Such partnerships are win-win situations that carry solid financial and environmental 
gains. The environmental benefits are numerous such as decreased land disposal (open 
dumping/land filling), introduction of renewable energy to replace of fossil fuel in industry as 
well as production of organic compost fertilizer. The revenue of a partnership such as the 
Reliance-Ismailya Governorate can, in turn, help the governorate sustain its MSWM system and 
the presence of a new sizable industry also translates to employment opportunities and economic 
growth.  
Challenges of the suggested policy reform 
The major challenge in such partnerships is to find a way to reconcile the differences 
between parties because the interests are not always aligned. In the words of a top-ranked 
government official The system is composed of multiple actors who do not share the same 
interests, so you need time to bring them on board (Top-ranked government official, 2015). 
Some of the challenges the Reliance-Ismaliya Governorate agreement faced during negotiations 
related to price per ton of waste to be delivered to the plant, ensuring the quality and quantity 
delivered and agreeing on the delivering party (Personal communication, private sector investor, 
2015). 
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Recommendation  
Again, it is highly advisable for the new Waste Management Regulatory Agency to develop a 
national policy to bring benchmarks of technical, financial, environmental and legal boundaries 
to force. This will greatly help create order and serve as a terms of reference for future 
collaboration with different stakeholders. It  is also expected to attract further interest from and 
investors who prefer working with a defined framework of action as opposed to vague and un-
uniform workplans devised by the local authorities (Personal communication, private sector 
investor, 2015). 
 
V- Reform of Administration at the Local Level  
Status in Cairo 
In addition to financial reform, the second issue that was viewed by all interviewed 
sources as a cornerstone to improving outcomes of the MSWM system is reform of 
administration at the local level. Testimonies from different stakeholders have narrated numerous 
accounts of bribery, false inspection reports, favoritism and exclusion of eligible companies from 
being contracted by local authorities. Egypt has long been known for its widespread corruption 
rates. Its corruption index has shown a consistency of corruption prevalence over the years, 
winning Egypt the 88th position in the least corrupt countries global index of 2015 (Transparency 
International). 
Prior to its dissolution, MURIS had plans to combat corruption of local monitoring and 
inspection by assigning a joint committee made up of ministry representatives, governorate/local 
authority representatives and local NGOs to share responsibility for it (Personal communication, 
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top-ranked government official, 2015). To date, no such committees have been formed and it is 
unclear whether the Waste Management Regulatory Agency will continue within this plan. 
Status in Brazil 
Generally speaking, Brazil’s corruption indicators are quite high, although its standing in 
global indicators has been better than Egypt over the past four years (Transparency 
International). Some corruption has been detected in Brazilian municipalities resulting from 
favoring some service providers to others in deciding on service fees (Marello and Helwege, 
2014). As previously explained, however, the institutional framework of managing solid waste in 
Brazil depends only on the local municipality while being governed to the national policy 
(Sheridan et al, 2012). Within such a system of well defined boundaries it is harder for 
corruption to be sustained at an advanced level.     
Benefits of the suggested policy reform 
In concept, limiting corruption is essentially crucial to ensure appropriate management of 
MSW in Greater Cairo. Involving ministries directly and NGOs representatives in the process, 
however, may create more complications than solutions.  
Challenges of the suggested policy reform 
Since findings have underscored the problems of dividing responsibility among many 
parties, in addition to financial constraints that the MSWM system is currently suffering, it may 
therefore be unwise to involve ministries and NGO representatives in the administration at the 
local level. Complications anticipated from involving NGOs pertain to: 
- Resistance of local authorities and lack of cooperation  
- Possible weakening in accountability due to further dispersion of the decision-making 
power. 
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- Further financial burdens resulting from added civil servants to the working team which 
translates to inflation in operational and administrative costs.  
-  Fostering possible conflicts of interest due to joint networks between some NGOs and the 
Zabaleen-led companies whom they will be required to monitor.  
Recommendation 
Adding an extra party to the local administration system, without implementing actual 
anti-corruption measures, does not guarantee outcomes and may even invite further corruption. 
Several anti-corruption procedures have been identified in the literature and can be used to 
devise a workplan fitting for the Cairo model. The World Bank recommends a set of strategies 
for dealing with such cases. Following is a brief of the ones most relevant and applicable for the 
case at hand: 
- Revising pay of civil servants: World bank has found that there is an inverse proportionality 
between the employee’s pay and his involvement in corruption (Lopez-Claros, 2014 ). 
Therefore, it is advisable to make sure employees with sensitive jobs such as monitoring and 
inspection are well compensated to discourage them from resorting to bribery.  
- Transparency of government spending: Making budgets available for the public is another 
way to limit possible fraud (Ibid). As the Waste Management Regulatory Agency may be 
subject to higher restrictions about transparency and dissemination of information, this may 
not be entirely applicable. A modified recommendation would be to have local authorities 
report to the Agency on phase-basis. The Agency could them perform regular audit and 
evaluation of the administrative, technical and financial standing of MSWM at the local 
level.  
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- Utilizing technology: ie. Making communication available between officials and the public 
to facilitate receipt of feedback (Ibid). The Agency may want to include a hotline or email 
address to receive complaints or concerns about MSWM in each areas. This will help verify 
the data reported by the local authorities.  
- Minimizing bureaucracy (Ibid): The Waste Management Regulatory Agency may choose to 
eliminate any unnecessary procedures taken by local authorities to contract as well as 
monitor and inspect operations of service providers.  
 
VI- Re-authorizing Pigs Farming 
Status in Cairo  
Recently, MURIS had taken action to re-allow pig rearing and issued an official letter to 
that extent. However, the decision still seems un-finalized by the government (Personal 
communication, top-ranked government official, 2015). It is not obvious now, after the re-
allocation of the SWM portfolio to the Waste Management Regulatory Agency in the MEA, 
whether continuing the authorization will remain a priority.  
Status in Brazil 
In Brazil there are no social constraints to pig farming unlike Egypt where it is 
stigmatized for religious reasons (Fahmi and Sutton, 2010). In fact, Brazil ranks fourth globally 
in swine production (Schmidt, 2009). The use of swine manure in composting is popularly 
endorsed in Brazil along with other recycling technologies generally supported (Ibid).  
Benefits of the suggested policy reform 
Pigs, unlike any alternative animal, contribute to producing high quality compost (Sarant, 
2010). In addition, they provide an incentive to Zabaleen to collect the waste owing to the high 
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profits gained from selling their meat (Fahmi and Sutton, 2010). Finally, pigs are the most const-
effective animal to use in composting (Personal Communication, APE representative, 2014). For 
these reasons it is advisable to revisit the previous decision to prohibit them.  
Challenges of the suggested policy reform 
There are two challenges that relate to re-allowing pig rearing. The first is the possible 
negative public reaction, since pig farming will be unwelcome on account of its prohibition in 
Islam (Fahmi and Sutton, 2010) and the second is deciding on an appropriate location for the pig 
farms.  
Recommendations 
Public awareness about the benefits of pigs to compost manufacture may help absorb 
negative reactions from the public, especially as well if it is correlated with achieving higher 
outcomes in waste collection. As for location, pig farms are best to be located close to the 
compost plants such as in Kattameya. Such locations are have low population densities and thus 
there will be less inconvenience to the community.  
On the subject of relocation, a top-ranked government official described Kattamiya as “The 
only logical location for relocating Zabaleen” since areas of it are relatively uninhabited and it is 
closer to the heart of Cairo than other locations suggested so far by the government such as Ain 
Sokhna (Personal communication, to-ranked government official, 2015). Worth noting is that 
Kattamiya was earmarked by the government in 2004 as one of the earliest targeted areas to 
relocate the Zabaleen (Fahmi and Sutton, 2006),  yet the relocation plans were never completed 
and the relocation area has been re-debated since then.  The Kattamiya district selected for 
Zabaleen was a new urban area in the Eastern desert, with little infrastructure, which made it less 
valuable a location compared to their current dwelling areas in the heart of Cairo (Ibid).  
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VII- Segregation at source  
Status in Cairo 
The idea of introducing segregation at source in households has been endorsed by 
different stakeholders and has seemingly achieved positive results when implemented on small 
short term scales by NGOs (Personal communication, APE NGO representative, 2015). The 
MURIS planned to introduce it at a national level by having waste collectors spread awareness to 
households and also evaluate their outcomes. Credit points would then be added to the grocery 
ration smart card of the tenant. Ration smart cards were introduced by the Egyptian government 
in 2014 to allow a fixed ration of subsidized bread, rice, cooking oil and sugar for each card 
holder (Ahmed, 2014).  
The decision to implement this project could have positive effects on all stages of 
MSWM as well as the recycling industry which heavily relies on the purity of segregated waste 
(Personal Communication, independent consultant, 2014).  
Status in Brazil 
Due to Brazilian plans to limit solid waste disposal in land through land-filling or open 
dumping, waste pickers have been successful at spreading awareness among households to 
encourage them to segregate their waste before throwing out (Martina El Al, 2012). The national 
policy for SWM issued in 2010, has also stressed the collective responsibility of all stakeholders 
in managing the process (Sheridan et al, 2012). 
Benefits of the suggested policy reform 
This program can bring multiple benefits to the MSWM stages, especially so to the 
recycling industry (Personal Communication, independent consultant, 2014).  
 
  91   
 
Challenge of the suggested policy reform 
 The main challenge for this project is that segregation at source is new to the Egyptian 
community (Personal Communication, independent consultant, 2014) and also new to the 
Egyptian government. It therefore needs careful planning before implementation to determine 
and account for the following; 
- Appropriate incentives to use and correct way of making it accessibly to households. 
- Tackling the possible competition and tension between tenants who will decide to sell their 
recyclables directly to dealers instead of deliver them to garbage collector (Personal 
Communication, independent community activist, 2015) 
- The optimal way to monitor performance and abiding by the system. 
- Without being coupled with activities that allow re-use of organic waste, it will not improve 
collection. 
- Possible resistance of households due to added cost of using extra garbage bags.  
Recommendation 
 Since the project is unprecedented in Egypt on the governmental scale, it is advisable to 
outsource an environmental consultant with experience in implementing such a project in the 
non-profit sector to set up an appropriate workplan.  
 Use of ration smart cards as a means to transfer incentive can be relevant to low-income 
households, who are eligible to receive subsidized food (Mamdouh, 2014), however, an 
alternative mean needs to be devised for high-medium income areas. The waste composition of 
High-medium income areas, as well, will contain a higher portion of recyclables thus making it 
more useful in recovery (Personal Communication, independent consultant, 2015). It is therefore 
advisable to prioritize targeting these areas.  
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5.2 Conclusions 
 The research has attempted to answer questions about the dynamics of Cairo’s municipal 
SWM including reasons why it is performing below expected levels, mapping and understanding 
stakeholder relations in addition to investigating future reform plans by the government. Brazil’s 
urban MSWM model was used as a case study for comparative analysis, according to which, a 
set of reform recommendations were formulated. The findings of the study have shown evidence 
to support the researcher’s claims about there being several factors, aside from incompetency of 
international service providers that share responsibility for Cairo’s current poor management 
model.  
 As shown from the findings, the government’s decision in 2002 to shift the management 
of MSW in Greater Cairo from informal Zabaleen to international private companies resulted 
from plausible administrative and environmental concerns about their previous management. 
Although successful in recycling the waste collected before 2002, the Zabaleen’s rate of 
collection was evidently low resulting in garbage accumulating in the streets. Although it is 
implies that the trend of poor collection began after the international companies took over 
(Fahmi and Sutton, 2010), the findings have proved otherwise. The state of Zabaleen’s unruly 
informality and lack of a representative organization to communicate professionally with the 
government, on their behalf, also weakened the perception about their accountability and pushed 
the government to seek alternatives.   
 The current multinational management model is falling short of required standards within 
every stage of the cycle for several reasons, most of which pertain to the government’s poor 
judgment and planning prior to the agreement. Results have shown that inaccurate financial 
forecasting and cost analysis required to maintain the program effectively is the main reason the 
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system is now failing. The companies are simply not being paid enough. As a result, they cover 
the portion of the services as they can afford which leaves the streets unclean and waste collected 
un-utilized. In addition, the absence of any preventive or penalizing measure to face corruption, 
at the local level, makes any efforts of reform fail.   
 The ex-MURIS has laid down some potentially solid reform intervention ideas for the 
post-multinational phase, several of which are also addressed in the NSWMP currently under 
development. Segregation at source and investment in waste-to-energy and recycling 
technologies are especially promising. But after the dissolution of the ministry in 2015 (Sabry, 
2015) and with responsibility shifting to a new authority, it is not yet clear to what extent these 
plans will remain within the agenda. Additionally, these reform concepts are apparently still in 
the research phase and need extensive research to formulate into an applicable strategy. With the 
multinational agreements coming to end in 2017 (Eco Con Serv, 2009), the timeframe available 
for the Waste Management Regulatory Agency in charge of waste management is already tight. 
For this reason, it is imperative that the Agency exercise full decision-making and have access to 
necessary tools and cooperation from associate ministries to formulate a successful reform plan. 
 The Brazilian cities’ MSWM experience offers a lot of useful lessons for Cairo. The 
importance of having a national policy for MSWM is perhaps one of the most important. Brazil’s 
2010 national policy sets the objectives and mission of MSWM across the country in endorsing 
and regulating recycling, supporting investment in waste, restricting unsanitary land-filling and 
recognizing waste management as a collective responsibility (Sheridan et al, 2012). The second 
essential experience to examine is how organization into cooperatives and networks has 
transitioned waste pickers from being detested illegal workers (Fergutz et al, 2012) into 
recognized partners of the local government (Sheridan et al, 2012). Waste pickers in Brazil, 
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much like Cairo’s Zabaleen, started out as informal un-organized people who were brilliant at 
recycling yet were deprived of legal and societal recognition (Ibid). With the support of their 
local NGOs, however, they were able to turn that around by organizing into legal bodies 
(Martina El Al, 2012), such as the National Movement of Recyclable Waste Pickers (MNCR), 
after which they earned voice and managed to fight their way into recognition by government 
and community (Dias, 2011). The NGO sector in Cairo has always played a vital role in 
supporting Zabaleen as well. Some NGO efforts also managed to encourage them into registering 
legally recognized national companies which is pre-requisite to being contracted by the local 
authorities. Although civil society in Egypt is currently restricted by authorities (UNCL, 2016), it 
is not expected that this would be a hindering factor since assisting Zabaleen legalize into 
companies falls within the government’s plan. The path, however, is still long for Zabaleen to 
catch up with their Brazilian counterparts who have understood the power of assembly and 
prioritizing collective good of their profession over personal gains and internal divisions.  
 There is much room for research on the subject of reform in SWM in Cairo. A further 
study for the financial assessment and cost-benefit analysis is recommended to determine the 
realistic cost of the service. An in-depth administrative reform and anti-corruption research 
would also help identify more diverse and precise methods the Egyptian government can use to 
fight this phenomenon at the local level.   
 There is doubtlessly room for much improvement in the status of Cairo’s MSWM. 
Reform requires multiples efforts, genuine desire and the ability to reconcile the different interest 
of all stakeholders to achieve best possible results. As previously stated by a top-ranked 
government official interviewed, the process consists of many actors and it is necessary to make 
an effort to bring them all on board.  
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